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NOTE
WHEN THE WALLS COME TUMBLING
DOWN-THEORIES OF RECOVERY FOR
DEFECTIVE HOUSING
This century has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number
of potential avenues through which home buyers, who have suffered personal injury or property damage due to defective construction of their homes, may obtain judicial redress. In their eagerness to circumvent the strictures of the caveat emptor bar,
judges have exercised considerable inventiveness in fashioning relief, employing such theories as fraud, negligence, or breach of warranty. The most recent addition to the homeowner's arsenal is a
theory of strict liability, analogous to that imposed upon manufacturers of defective chattels. Consequently, the present state of the
law regarding defective realty is an uncomfortable blend of tort,
contract, and warranty precepts. It is impossible adequately to
comprehend or to synthesize the decisions and the often contradictory underlying principles holding sway in this field, or to chart a
suggested course for this body of law, without a thorough understanding of its jurisprudential sources.
Toward this end, the historical development of tort law initially will be discussed.1 Thereafter, this Note will trace the evolution in sales of realty from the era of caveat emptor to the dawning
of strict liability. Within the confines of real property law, the
Note will examine the effect of the judicial impulse toward order
on the formation of home buyers' remedies by juxtaposing this impulse against a growing recognition of the need for policy-based
The tort section of this Note draws much of its inspiration from the theories pro-

pounded by Professor G. E. White. See G.E.

WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLEC-

(1980). For alternative perspectives on the emergence of 19th-century tort
doctrine, see generally M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. RE V. 359 (1951);
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Schwartz, Tort Law and the

TUAL HISTORY

Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation,90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981).
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consumer protection. The final section of the Note will focus on
the particularly troublesome area of distinguishing the type of
damages that are recoverable by first and subsequent purchasers of
a house, and of delineating the components of the theory of relief
under which they should bring their actions. It will be argued that
the unique features which distinguish an action involving a defective house from one involving a defective product favor an idiosyncratic framework of home buyer relief. Under such a system, damages for any defect that threatens occupant safety should be
recoverable by any occupant under a theory of strict tort liability.
Defects which merely lower the value of the house, but do not give
rise to the policy considerations of consumer protection that support an action in strict tort, should be recoverable only by parties
in privity with the builder-vendor in a breach of implied warranty
action.
THE CONCEPTUAL BASES OF TORT LAW

From Law as Science to Law as Social Policy
Historically, it was considered an inappropriate exercise of the
judicial function for a court to indulge in considerations of public
policy. 2 The 19th-century conception of American law was one of
"legal science,"' a view characterized by an impulse toward order
2 Public policy, defined as "'a principle of judicial legislation or interpretation founded
on the current needs of the community,'" Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common
Law, 42 HARV. L. REv. 76, 92 (1928), was considered a "last resort" in reaching a decision
where precedent otherwise was available. Id. at 98. In the absence of settled precedent, a
somewhat greater flexibility was possible at early common law, and harsh results were sometimes avoided by modification or extension of the rules. Id. at 77. The eventual hardening of
rules of law into doctrines that were rigidly applied led, in the.mid-14th century, to the

growth of the Court of Chancery in England. S. WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN

LAW 34 (1929). This forerunner of the equity courts, while not empowered to overturn
rules of law, often declined to apply them when the result would be unjust. Id. at 34-35. The
attempt to mold rules of law into "universal doctrines" took place in America in the 19th
century under the banner of legal science. See notes 4-5 and accompanying text infra.
3 The concept of legal science was imported from the physical sciences, where knowledge is gained empirically. Thus, the method of legal science in deducing a principle can be
illustrated through comparison with the method of the physical sciences in deducing a physical law. If an apple is raised and dropped enough times, the law of gravity will be established, based upon the scientist's observations. A decision in a particular case gives rise to a
rule; from numbers of decisions on similar facts the lawyer may establish a general principle. S. WILLISTON, supra note 2, at 122-23. Under this view of law, to argue against the
application of the general principle to a similar state of facts because of its harsh result is
tantamount to standing in the way of progress, and is decried as "an abnegation both of
taking part in the development of the law and also of any considerable understanding of law
THE
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and systematization,4 and by an emphasis upon the creation and
utilization of comprehensive doctrines.5 With the advent of an increasingly urban and industrialized society in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, this static framework for the creation of remedies began to show signs of strain.' Cases arising in
novel and unprecedented factual contexts were not easily disposed
of by resort to established doctrines, and courts struggling to place
the demands of a burgeoning society within the strictures of these
doctrines were hampered by a "fundamental tension" between the
methodology used and the goal sought to be achieved.'
as a science." Id. at 124. Of course, empirical observation takes place, of necessity, under
laboratory conditions. This aspect of legal science-its isolation from conditions in society-aroused severe criticism. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text infra.
" Fundamental to the concept of legal science is the method of studying law propounded by Christopher Columbus Langdell, appointed professor at Harvard Law School in
1869. S. WILLISTON, supra note 2, at 112. Students were to study cases in order to extract
legal principles of universal application, and success in this endeavor was measured by the
ability to apply such principles "with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled
skein of human affairs." Id. at 113 (quoting C. LANGDELL, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(1st ed. 1871)). This technique makes the fashioning of a remedy a process of deduction
from an already existing body of rights and liabilities-a closed system. Bloustein, Logic
and Legal Realism: The Realist as a Frustrated Idealist, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 24, 24 (1964).
One commentator has set forth a particularly isolationist view of legal science, characterizing it as the "pursuit of truth for its own sake," justified by the gratification of intellectual
curiosity that attends it. H. CAIRNS, THE THEORY OF LEGAL SCmNCE 130 (1941). According to
this view, it is merely incidental that the pursuit may yield benefits of practical value to
society. Id. at 132-34.
5 See G.E. WHITE, supra note 1, at 61. Two of Professor White's premises are particularly enlightening when applied to the subject at hand. First, the characterization of 19thcentury tort law as primarily a system of comprehensive doctrines is contrasted with the
movement in the 20th century to recognize it as an instrument of public policy. Id. at 60-62,
66-67, 72-73. Second, he speaks of the 19th-century creation of an "academic-judicial symbiosis," under which the writers of treatises and law review articles were relied upon to provide analytical guidance by organizing the cases in a comprehensive manner. Id. at 39-40.
This relationship between legal scholars and the courts is set out as follows: (1) scholars sift
out, from judicial opinions, principles which are articulated as guides to the area of law; (2)
as new fact situations are presented, courts refer to these principles, which they revise and
modify; (3) commentators note these modified principles and create new syntheses of them.
Id. at 39. This relationship, which continues today, is particularly evident in the development of strict products liability. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960). Prosser noted that many of the arguments advanced in favor of strict liability "appear[ed] to have been concocted in the heads
of professors." Id.
' See G.E. WHITE, supra note 1, at 61-62.
Id. at 55. The primary weakness of legal science in the late 19th century was its inability to reconcile its doctrinal acceptance of the notion that the law is in a state of flux
with its endeavor to establish principles capable of comprehensive application to all factual
contexts. Id.
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This tension was particularly evident in the law of torts and it
was there, in the origins of modern negligence theory, that the

emerging recognition of law as an instrument of social, as opposed
to scientific, order s manifested itself.9 In the landmark case of

Brown v. Kendall,10 Chief Justice Shaw of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts eviscerated the concept that a man acts at
his peril,1 and clearly articulated fault as the preeminent principle
of liability. Rendered at the midpoint of the century, the decision

and its progeny, reflecting a transitional stage in judicial thought,

served a dual purpose. On the one hand, a concept which imposed
liability only upon proof of fault functioned in the traditionally

valued manner of a comprehensive organizing system. It subsumed
the relief of civil wrongs under what were deemed universal principles, applicable to any of a variety of private relationships. More

significantly, however, it has been persuasively argued that the establishment of negligence as the cornerstone of liability served the
purpose of limiting the expanding scope of industrial liability. 2 As

industry and shipping grew, greater numbers of accidents occurred
among parties who were essentially strangers, to whom no duty of
8 Bloustein, supra note 4, at 24.
9 Recognition of a separate body of tort law dealing with remedies for unintentional
harm is generally traced from the early to mid-19th century. R. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON
TORT LAW 1 (1969); see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at 139 (4th ed.
1971). The theoretical origins of a fault-based theory of liability are subject to dispute. See
generally R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE 148-49 (1969). Keeton collects the following arguments: the law began under a moral system in which a man acts at his peril, and
evolved to a theory of fault as the basis for liability; the maxim that a man acts at his peril
has never been true, since even actions under strict liability were subject to justification and
excuse; the process of law synthesizes guilt from a moral value to an objective standard,
making actual guilt almost irrelevant; fault has always been a significant factor in imposing
liability, but the emphasis placed upon it has fluctuated. Id.; see Malone, Ruminations on
the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1, 24-43
(1970). Regardless of the historical antecedents, the significant transition that occurred in
the mid-19th century was from the view that held a person strictly liable for the consequences of his voluntary act, unless he could establish that the accident was "inevitable," to
the view that liability should not be imposed absent wrongful intent or negligence. W. PROSSER, supra, § 29, at 141-42. But see R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 27 & nn.
8-10 (1980) (strict liability continued to be imposed for injury to real estate, defamation,
and conversion of personal property).
10 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
1 See Jenks, On Negligence and Deceit in the Law of Torts, 26 LAW Q. REV. 159, 160
(1910).
12 W. SEAVEY, COGITATIONS ON TORTS

3, 24 (1954). The concept of negligence pre-dated

the Industrial Revolution, but was not refined or accorded its preeminent role in tort law
until the advent of the "machine age." Id.
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care based on a specific relationship could be extended.1 3 A generalized standard of legal duty was needed to order suits between
such strangers. 4 The creation of a fault standard, however, went
beyond a mere ordering principle, and functioned as a limitation of
liability, since a plaintiff could recover only upon a showing that
the conduct which injured him was blameworthy.' 5 This limitation
has been characterized as a "judicial subsid[y]" to the fledgling enterprises of the period, allowing industries engaged in risk-creating
activity to grow unfettered by the capital-depleting lawsuits of injured employees.' 6
Tort law at the close of the nineteenth century reflected a laissez-faire attitude toward industry, a refusal to compensate an injured party absent blameworthy conduct by the defendant,' 7 and a
continuing attempt to articulate comprehensive doctrines. As the
twentieth century began, social critics protested the conditions of
urban living.' 8 At the same time, legal commentators criticized the
"3

G.E. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 182-83 (1978).

14 Id.

5 G.E. WHITE, supra note 1, at 61. Professor White has summarized the concurrently
expanding and contracting effect of the fault principle on tort liability as follows: "[n]eglect
was widened to become a generalized theory of legal carelessness; an objective fault standard emerged as a limiting principle of tort liability; modern negligence was born." G.E.
WHITE, supra note 13, at 183.
" Gregory, supra note 1, at 368. It has been speculated that protection of industry is a
fair interpretation of the motive underlying Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in Brown v.
Kendall, see notes 10-16 and accompanying text supra, drawing support from Shaw's approval in other cases of the assumption of risk defense and fellow servant doctrine, both

devices which protected industry at the expense of workers. Gregory, supra note 1, at 368.
While such policies may seem "ruthless," they may be justified as having "helped to establish industry, which in turn was essential to the good society as Shaw envisaged it." Id. But
see Posner, supra note 1, at 30 (connection between adoption of negligence standard and
judicial subsidy to industry is "ambiguous"); Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to ?
An Intellectual Escapade in a Tory Vein, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 191, 205 (1965) (rationale of
Brown v. Kendall premised not on mere protection of industry but on desire to articulate
"sound policy not only for business but for every man").
'" Posner, supra note 1, at 29. The origins of the judicial refusal to shift the burden of
loss from the injured party absent a showing of blameworthiness can be traced in part to the
exigencies of the Industrial Revolution and in part to the "individualistic" philosophy which
pervaded American society. See id. The general principle was succinctly articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes as requiring that "loss from accident must lie where it falls, and
this principle is not affected by the fact that a human being is the instrument of misfortune."

O.W.

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 94 (1923).

'8 G.E. WHITE, supra note 1, at 103-04. In the political sphere, the progressive movement criticized the poverty and hardship created by unchecked growth and industrialization, and demanded a more paternalistic attitude by government and the courts to promote
general social welfare. Id. In the literary sphere, journalist-photographer Jacob Riis chronicled the squalid living conditions in New York's lower east side, where industrialization
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courts' obsession with universal principles as "mechanical jurispru' impotent in the
dence,"19
face of social needs. A call was made for
a flexible "sociological jurisprudence" 20 which would be more responsive to these rapidly changing demands.
The movement toward an overt recognition of societal interests was begun in the first half of the twentieth century,2 ' as
courts, working within the fault framework, began to balance competing interests. 22 The balancing process, however, necessarily detracted from the efficacy of negligence as a universal ordering principle, since courts employing the inherently subjective "reasonable
man" standard were less likely to arrive at uniform, predictable
results.2 3
Similarly, the utility of the doctrine of privity as an ordering
principle upon negligence suits involving defective products was
severely undercut by the seminal decision of the New York Court
of Appeals in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 24 Judge Cardozo,
writing for the MacPhersoncourt, rejected the traditional rule that
a duty of care arises only between parties in a contractual relationship,25 and concluded that liability could be imposed upon a manufacturer whenever a "known danger [was] attendant upon a known
use." 28 The MacPherson case exemplifies the period's judicial
trend toward a recognition of the needs of various segments of society and a willingness actively to reassess the appropriate allocation of risks among these segments.2 7 This trend persisted after
combined with overcrowding and continued European immigration to produce a permanent
underprivileged class. See generally Cordasco, Preface to JACOB RIIs REVISITED: POVERTY

xv-xxii (F. Cordasco ed. 1968).
" Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 606 (1908).
20 Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 464 (1909). Sociological jurisprudence
has been defined as "the movement for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to the
human conditions they are to govern rather than to assumed first principles ...." Id.
2' See McNiece & Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete?, 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
255, 258-59 (1952).
22 See W. SEAVEY, supra note 12, at 27-28. The formulation for interest-balancing may
be stated generally as the interests of the parties evaluated with respect to the welfare of
the community. Id. at 27. An attempt to articulate this formula in mathematical terms suggested that when the probability of an accident (P) multiplied by the projected loss (L) of
the accident exceeds the burden (B) of its prevention, or PL>B, the conduct is negligent.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, L., J.).
23 G.E. WHITE, supra note 1, at 107.
24 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
25 Id. at 392-93, 111 N.E. at 1054.
28 Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
27 See G.E. WHITE, supra note 13, at 95.
AND THE SLUM IN ANOTHER ERA
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World War II, when courts began to balance interests without regard to fault, and culminated in the development of strict liability,
"a pure matter of social engineering. "28

Strict Liability: A Judicial Refocusing
The twentieth century movement from a liability-limiting,
fault-based conception of tort law to a theory of liability without
fault for certain classes of defendants was the product of a correlative change in the intellectual climate and social conditions.29 The
nascent industries of the mid-nineteenth century were well entrenched and thriving, but the disadvantaged groups created by industrialization and urbanization were beginning to be perceived in
a different light. The notion that an injury to one member of society might be, in a conceptual sense, an injury to society as a whole,
implicated society at large in the redress of that injury.30 Thus, the
social policies effectuated by tort remedies were accepted as being
of far greater importance than any type of categorical doctrine underlying these remedies. 1
The growing sense of social responsibility intertwined with the
desire to protect those unable adequately to fend for themselves
led to the application of strict liability initially to sales of food and
drink,3 2 then to products for "intimate bodily use," 33 and eventually to a wide range of consumer products." The theoretical under28

F.

HARPER,

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

TORTS 334 (1933); see Roberts, supra note 16,

at 191.
29 For a striking example of the initial judicial aversion to liability without fault, see
Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 285, 94 N.E. 431, 436 (1911). In Ives, the New York
Court of Appeals struck down the state's first workmen's compensation statute, a narrowly
drawn departure from fault-based liability, as not only unconstitutional but, "judged by...
common law standards[,] . . . plainly revolutionary." Id. Echoing Justice Holmes, see note
17 supra, the court declared that "in everything within the sphere of human activity the
risks which are inherent and unavoidable must fall upon those who are exposed to them."
201 N.Y. at 305, 94 N.E. at 444. An amendment to the New York State Constitution and,
ultimately, approval by the United States Supreme Court was required before workmen's
compensation laws took effect in New York. See New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S.
188, 195-96, 208 (1917).
11 G.E. WHITE, supra note 1, at 148. The conception of a tort suit was changing from
that of a "two-party affair" to that of a "'three-party affair,' in which the third party was
society at large." Id.
31 Id. at 150.

supra note 9, § 97, at 653.
at 654 & n.34.

2 W. PROSSER,
33 Id.
34

Id. at 655 & n.37.
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pinnings for these cases were far from uniform, 5 as the judicial
response to the perceived need for remedies outstripped the formulation of a comprehensive doctrine to justify granting them.3 6
The remedy used with the greatest consistency, however, was that
of an implied warranty of fitness.3"
The use of warranty as a vehicle for imposing liability without
fault created confusion from the outset as to whether the remedy
sounded in contract or tort.3 8 The leading case granting relief with35 Cases circumventing the privity bar provide a striking
illustration of the lack of uniformity in the underlying theoretical bases of early strict liability cases. See R. EPSTEIN,
supra note 9, at 32-34. Courts resorted to a variety of legal fictions to accord an out-ofprivity plaintiff a remedy, including characterizing the plaintiff as the real party in interest
regardless of who had bought the product; analogizing warranties of fitness "running" with
the product to covenants running with the land; finding an assignment of the cause of action
to the plaintiff; or finding a third-party beneficiary contract with the plaintiff as the beneficiary. Id. at 33.
" An examination of the early period of inconsistent theories of recovery without fault
reveals an intermediate step in the transition from negligence to strict liability. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 30. First, a more stringent standard of care was imposed upon manufacturers of consumer goods, particularly food, so that proof of the food's purity was required, rather than a mere showing that reasonable care was taken to make it pure. Id. at
30-31. It has been suggested that there is no significant difference between proving a defect,
defined under strict liability theory as a reasonably foreseeable, "harm-causing characteristic," and proving the manufacturer to be negligent under this standard. R. KEErrON, supra
note 9, at 109. The evidence required and its effect on the jury would be the same. Id.
Second, liberal use of res ipsa loquitur shifted the burden of proving freedom from negligence, once the defect was established, to the manufacturer. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 31.
See also Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. Rnv.
643, 647 (1978).
The plaintiff in a negligence case must prove: (1) his injury was caused by a defect; (2)
the defect existed when the product left the manufacturer; and (3) the defect was caused by
the manufacturer's negligence. The point has been made that strict liability theory is of no
help to the plaintiff in establishing the first two requirements. Prosser, supra note 5, at
1114. The link between the defect and the manufacturer's negligence is the easiest element
to prove, and a plaintiff aided by res ipsa loquitur invariably gets his case before the jury.
Id. Once the cause of the injury is "laid at [the manufacturer's] doorstep," a jury verdict for
the defendant manufacturer is "virtually unknown." Id. at 1115.
17 Three distinct bases have been identified for the implied warranty of fitness: (1) a
tort theory of misrepresentation upon which the buyer relies; (2) an implied in fact contract
term agreed upon by the parties in the contract of sale; or (3) a term read into the contract
as a matter of law by virtue of the sale, whether the parties intended it or not. Prosser, The
Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 122-24 (1943). Dean
Prosser found no significant difference among the various theories, noting that "courts have
flitted cheerfully from one to another as the facts may demand, always tending to an increasing extent to favor the buyer and find the warranty." Id. at 124-25 (citations omitted).
" See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 97, at 655. Warranty was historically a tort concept,
but the word itself was so closely identified with the existence of a contract of sale that it
was always attended by rules of sales law. Id.; see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 801 (1966).
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out requiring proof of fault and without invoking privity was Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.3 9 Decided under the Uniform
Sales Act,4 0 Henningsen is notable for its handling of the privity
issue and the seller's attempts to disclaim liability.
The court had no difficulty finding an implied warranty of
safety running from the manufacturer and dealer of the defective
automobile to the purchaser. 41 Notably, the injured plaintiff was
the wife of the purchaser and not a party to the contract of sale.
By "parity of reasoning," the policy considerations which would allow a buyer to maintain an action against a manufacturer, even
though he had dealt only with the dealer, were invoked to permit
42
Mrs. Henningsen to bring suit, despite the lack of privity.
The court next examined the clauses in both the manufacturer's and dealer's contracts which disclaimed all liability for personal injury and found them to be unfairly obtained, given the relative bargaining positions of the parties. 43 Relying on "[a]n
instinctively felt sense of justice," the court struck down the exculpatory clauses and upheld recovery under the implied warranty
44

theory.

Although the Henningsen decision was immediately acclaimed
as a landmark in consumer protection, it has since been assessed as
"clearly flawed in all its essentials. '4 5 Nowhere in the opinion is
the theory of strict tort liability mentioned. Rather, the case osten-- 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). The Henningsen decision has been characterized as
"the date of the fall of the citadel of privity." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel,supra note
38, at 791.
" 32 N.J. at 370-74, 161 A.2d at 76-78. The court also referred to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which had not yet been enacted in New Jersey. Id. at 415, 161 A.2d at
100-01.
"' Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84. Despite the absence of privity between the purchaser, who
dealt only with the car dealer, and the manufacturer, the court found an implied warranty
running from the manufacturer to the ultimate purchaser based on "modern marketing conditions" in which the manufacturer actively promotes sales of his product to consumers. Id.
" Id. at 412-16, 161 A.2d at 99-101. In granting relief absent privity, the court evidenced an awareness that it was going beyond the current state of the law, noting that "[i]t
is important to express the right of Mrs. Henningsen to maintain her action in terms of a
general principle." Id. at 414, 161 A.2d at 100. The court did not reach the question of how
far the privity requirement should be relaxed, stopping at the "general principle" that with
respect to a car, the purchaser, his family, and others occupying or using it with his consent
should be included in the seller's warranties. Id.
11 Id. at 385-404, 161 A.2d at 84-95. The court's analysis of the circumstances and terms
of the parties' contract owes much to the UCC's provision on unconscionability. Id. at 40304, 161 A.2d at 95; see U.C.C. § 2-302.
32 N.J. at 388, 161 A.2d at 85.
R. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 53.
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sibly was decided under codifications of sales law which regulated
transactions between buyers and sellers. Moreover, in light of the
increasing judicial activism in affording relief to consumers of all
types of products under a strict liability theory, the Henningsen
court's invalidation of the seller's attempts to limit its liability in
effect "neutralized the possibility that private contracts could
check judicial excesses.

' 46

One of the leading academic commenta-

tors 47of the time, however, was urging even greater judicial activism.

Dean Prosser contended that the impediments to increased

relief, inherent in warranty law, 48 demanded that courts cease to
employ the language of warranty and openly embrace a theory of
strict tort liability that was not dependent on any contractual relationship, but rather, was imposed by law as a matter of public
policy.

49

Shortly thereafter, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
46 Id.
at 56. The Henningsen court's handling of the contract provision limiting the
seller's liability has been criticized as too extreme on a practical level. Id. at 52. Rather than
refusing to give effect to such clauses, it has been argued that the court should have required only that they be printed in a size and type conspicuous enough to alert the consumer, who is free to accept or reject their terms. Id. Moreover, it has been suggested that
the court failed clearly to establish why, absent fraud or duress, the contract was the result
of overreaching or an unequal bargaining position, since automobile manufacturers do not
"conscript unwilling persons as their customers." Id. at 53. On a conceptual level, the court
overlooked the possibility that the limited warranty was a benefit to both buyer and seller,
id., with the buyer's benefit being reflected in a reduced sale price. Id. at 53-54. The lower
price is thus the quid pro quo of the limited warranty. Id. Finally, Henningsen, by its excesses, has been read as an indictment of modern manufacturing and marketing practices,
thus providing implicit encouragement of an even more consumer-protective, remedy-oriented attitude by the judiciary. Id. at 56.
47 See Prosser, supra note 5, at 1134. In much quoted language, Prosser articulated
what amounted to a rallying cry for strict liability in tort:
No one doubts that, unless there is privity, liability to the consumer must be in
tort and not in contract. There is no need to borrow a concept from the contract
law of sales; and it is 'only by some violent pounding and twisting' that 'warranty'
can be made to serve the purpose at all. Why talk of it? If there is to be strict
liability in tort, let there be strict liability in tort, declared outright, without an
illusory contract mask.
Id. (citation omitted). Prosser's metaphorical title (The Assault Upon the Citadel), borrowed from Judge Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174
N.E. 441, 445 (1931), is significant. Imagery of storming the gates, of bringing to the ground
an "edifice" (precedent) both formidable and faintly sinister may have appealed, albeit subconsciously, to the growing judicial impulse to shape remedies to right social wrongs. Cf.
Shanker, A Case of Judicial Chutzpah (The Judicial Adoption of Strict Tort Products
Liability Theory), 11 AKRON L. REv. 697, 697 (1978) (development of strict tort liability
likened to pursuit of the Holy Grail).
48 W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 98, at 656-58.

4"

Id.
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Inc.,50 a leading torts jurist distinguished the nature and purpose
of warranties in sales law from the theory of strict tort.5 1 Sales law,
held Judge Traynor, regulates the relationship between buyer and
seller which necessarily grows out of a contract. In contradistinction, strict tort was held to operate outside of the contract, fulfilling the public policy of allocating the costs of injuries resulting
52
from defective products among society at large.
Ultimately, in 1965, the theory of strict liability for defective
products was articulated, entirely without reference to the language of warranty, by the American Law Institute in section 402A
of the Second Restatement of Torts.5 3 With the exception of section 402A, strict products liability theory is an entirely judge-made
system of allocating the costs of injuries."
50 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (Traynor, J.) (en banc).
Id. at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The facts on which Greenman
arose necessitated distinguishing the warranty remedy from that of strict tort liability in
order to grant relief. Under California's version of the Uniform Sales Act, in effect at the
time, a purchaser who did not give notice of the breach within a reasonable time was precluded from relief. The plaintiff in Greenman had not notified the retailer and manufacturer of the claimed breaches of warranty until 102 months after he was injured. Id. at 59,
377 P.2d at 898-99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99.
" See id. at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Central to Judge Traynor's
conclusion that warranty law governing commercial transactions is not applicable to the
manufacturer's liability to an injured purchaser is his formulation of the purpose that strict
tort liability is to serve: "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that'put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Id.
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The Restatement provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
I See Gregory, supra note 1, at 384-85. The degree of judicial activism involved in the
development of strict products liability, and the lack of clarity in the articulation of its
principles, was noted with disapproval:
But see what has been going on in this country under the name of implied warranties, to protect consumers at the cost of manufacturers not in privity of contract
with them, when some of our courts get impatient over the fact that there is no
evidence of negligence on which to allow recovery. This perversion of good old
legal doctrine is bewildering; it is all right, perhaps, as far as the social result is
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Significantly, during the same period in which Greenmans5
and section 402A articulated the theory of strict liability for defective products, the Uniform Commercial Code was beginning to be
adopted throughout the states. 5 The question which immediately
arose, and still has not been fully resolved, was the extent to which
the two bodies of law that purport to offer protection to the consumer are coextensive or preemptive. 57 To the extent that the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code have been perceived to be
inconsistent with or restrictive of the consumer's remedy, the Code
largely has been disregarded.5 s This evidences a drastic change in
judicial thought with respect to the judiciary's perception of the

nature of its role. The resultant trend toward increased judicial autonomy in fashioning remedies based on public policy has undergone severe criticism.5 9
concerned, but it is a type of judicial legislation which is defensible only if the
courts call it by its right name of absolute liability without fault, or, if I may
suggest a new term, enterprise liability.
Id.
See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of ProductsLiability and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Commentary on JurisprudentialEclipses, Pigeonholesand Communication Barriers, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 5, 5-6 (1965).
57 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965). The comment to
section 402A of the Restatement emphasizes the independence of strict tort from the UCC,
stating that "[t]he rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. With respect to the more
extreme positions on the relationship between strict tort liability and the UCC, the notion
that the two fields have "distinct orbits in the jurisprudential heavens wherein each shines
without interfering with the other" has been generally discounted. Shanker, supra note 56,
at 10. It has also been noted that, though increased consumer protection may have been one
of the aims of the drafters of the UCC, the Code when enacted clashed with the recent
liberalized case law on defective products. The result was that the UCC, with its provisions
dealing with notice, privity, and disclaimer, had an inhibiting effect on manufacturer liability. R. KEETON, supra note 9, at 115-16. If one takes the position that the two bodies of law
are coextensive, one might argue for a judicial formulation of strict products liability that
would incorporate the statutory restrictions of notice, privity, and disclaimer. Id. at 115.
Viewing the two as "parallel but competing," and accepting strict tort as independent from
the UCC results in strict tort "displac[ing] and eclips[ing]" the parallel UCC provisions.
Shanker, supra note 56, at 10-11.
" See note 57 supra.
59 For a particularly apoplectic response to judicial neglect of the UCC in favor of strict
tort, see Shanker, supra note 47, at 705, in which the author asks "since when does a court
get the power to ignore a validly enacted statute, just because the court does not like what
the statute says and wishes that it had said something else?" Id.; see Shanker, supra note
56, at 11 n.20. Even the leading proponent of strict tort, noting the rapidity with which it
had been adopted as the all but exclusive remedy in defective products cases, wondered
"[w]hether, given enough time-say another decade-the sales law of warranties might have
worked out a method of dealing effectively with these problems. . . ." Prosser, supra note
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It was, of course, inevitable that the consumer-oriented tort
remedies fashioned by the courts to deal with defective products
would filter into the area of housing, another consumer "product,"
but one traditionally subject to the particularly rigid doctrines of
real property law. 0 Having examined the judicial dismissal of "analytical jurisprudence" in favor of a more flexible system of redress
in tort, a similar process, proceeding at a slower pace, will be examined in the area of real property. This examination leads inevitably to the question of whether the "complex developments indigenous to the law of products liability""1 will be extended to the
sale of housing and, if so, how and with what effect.
REAL PROPERTY LAW: FROM CAVEAT EMPTOR TO CAVEAT VENDITOR

Caveat Emptor and Merger: Decline and Fall
Property law historically has been hidebound with rigid doctrines.6 2 One of the most rigid and significant of these was the doctrine of caveat emptor. Originally applicable to all types of commercial

transactions

between

vendor

and

purchaser, 63

this

38, at 801.
10See D. WHALEY, WARRANTIES AND THE PRACTITIONER 230 (1981). Courts recognized
that the reliance a consumer placed on the representations of a seller, or at least on the
assumption that the purchased good would meet minimum standards of merchantability,
was an interest worthy of protection. This change in judicial attitude made the need for
changes in real property law to protect a purchaser's interest more compelling. Id. The process by which the courts constructed a body of remedies for home buyers has been described
as the "utilization of dynamic and flexible legal concepts when the more archaic and immutable ones failed them." Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults
Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541, 543 (1961).
"1Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature Relating to the
Liability of Housing Merchants for Personal Injuries and Breach of Warranty, [1967] N.Y.
LAW REV. COMM'N REP. 30.
62 See generally W. LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED: OR THE PEOPLE VS. BLACKSTONE,
KENT, GRAY, AND STARE DEcIsIs 7-12 (1967). Blackstone characterized the static framework

of rules governing the law of real property in England as "a fine artificial system, full of
unseen connections and nice dependencies." Id. at 2. The major flaw of such a system is its
inherent fragility when confronted with modern conditions. This concept is implicit in
Blackstone's warning that "he who breaks one link of the chain endangers the dissolution of
the whole." Id. (quoting Perrin v. Blake, reported in HARGRAVE, TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE
LAW OF ENGLAND 489 (1787)).
The idiosyncratic system of rules applicable to real property has been explained as
growing out of the fixed and permanent nature of land. In contrast, the "expanding and
transient market for goods" demanded "commercial fluidity" and a law of sales responsive
to change. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 6-6, at 170 (4th ed. A. Squillante & J. Fonseca 1973).
83 See Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1136-56,
1158-78 (1931). For a comprehensive discussion of the historical foundations of caveat
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inflexible rule continued to influence land sales long after its scope
had been curtailed in the area of personal property.6 4 As a general
principle arising from land sale disputes, caveat emptor constituted a simple and effective judicial incantation to the unwary purchaser: absent an express agreement to the contrary, the seller of
real estate was not liable to the purchaser for the defective condition of the premises. 5 The doctrine was grounded in the notion
that if the purchaser had an adequate opportunity to inspect the
emptor, applied in the area of personal property, see id. at 1136 n.11. Linking the development of a doctrine that the buyer must be aware of the risks of a commercial transaction to
the moral values of the time, Hamilton finds no place for caveat emptor in the Middle Ages.
Id. at 1136. The religious spirit of the age excoriated trade as an indulgence in avarice, one
of the seven deadly sins. Id. at 1137, 1139. The merchant, who was perceived in such an
unfavorable light, was still held responsible for the quality of his wares pursuant to the
prevailing system of Christian ethics. Id. at 1141. A doctrine which placed the risk of unscrupulous practices upon the buyer was inconsistent with such a system. Id. It was not
until trade developed and was to a degree legitimized, in the 17th and 18th centuries, that
the concept of caveat emptor became firmly entrenched. Id. at 1162-63.
In the United States, the "triumph" of caveat emptor is linked not to morality but to
the economy, specifically the growing industrial society. Id. at 1178. In 1870, the United
States Supreme Court placed its imprimatur upon the doctrine, declaring it to be of "universal acceptance" in every state save one. Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383, 388-

89 (1870).
11 See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1.2(n), at
30-32 (3d ed. 1975) (doctrine "flourishes" in sales of realty); Bearman, supra note 60, at 542
(doctrine "still clings tenaciously" to sales of realty); Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38
TEX. L. REV. 439, 445 (1960) ("courts have been very slow" to demand that seller reveal
defects in realty). One explanation for the divergence between the law of personalty and
that of realty with respect to caveat emptor is the timing of the emergence of mass production techniques. Bearman, supra note 60, at 542. Mass-produced chattels were one result of
the Industrial Revolution, and concerns about quality control may have hastened the demise of caveat emptor. Id. at 542-43. With the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act and later
the UCC, the doctrine was divested of its remaining power with respect to personal property. Id. It was not until 1945 that similar techniques were employed in the building industry to meet the post-World War II demand for housing. Id.; Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967).
11See 8A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §
4470, at 393 (1963); Bearman, supra note 60,, at 542; Note, Phasing Out Caveat Emptor:
Implied Warranties in Builder-Vendor Contracts, 2 CAP. U.L. REV. 199, 200-01 (1973). Until approximately 20 years ago, courts were still invoking the doctrine of caveat emptor as a
bar to implied warranties in the sale of realty. See, e.g., Steiber v. Palumbo, 219 Or. 479,
490, 347 P.2d 978, 983 (1959) (en banc) (court precluded by statute from "summoning...
implied warranties"), overruled, Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974); Levy
v. C. Young Constr. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 296, 134 A.2d 717, 719 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1957) (recognition of implied warranties would render real estate transactions "chaotic"),
aff'd, 26 N.J. 330, 139 A.2d 738 (1958), overruled, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J.
70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Dennison v. Harden, 29 Wash. 2d 243, 250, 186 P.2d 908, 912 (1947)
(court found no cases recognizing "such a thing as an implied warranty in the sale of real
estate").
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premises,"6 he would be bound by whatever knowledge of defects
his inspection should have revealed. 7 If he was hesitant to rely
upon his own perceptions, the proper course was to exact an express warranty of fitness from the vendor.'$ The other principal
means by which a purchaser could have avoided the remedial bar
posed by caveat emptor was by establishing fraud on the part of
the vendor.6 '
60 See

Dunham, Vendor's Obligationas to Fitness of Land for a ParticularPurpose, 37
L. REV. 108, 110 (1953). The belief that a vendee's inspection adequately will protect
him from defects dates back to a society in which the parties to the transaction were of the
same community and were familiar with each other's land. Id. To place the risk of inspection upon the vendee was not inequitable, since the bifurcated process by which land and a
house were purchased during that time afforded the vendee other remedies for subsequently
discovered defects. Id. at 111. It was customary for the 19th-century purchaser to carry out
two distinct transactions, first, the purchase of the land, and second, the hiring of an architect and builder to construct the house. If defects subsequently developed in the house, the
architect could be sued in negligence, Roberts, supra note 64, at 837, or the builder could be
sued on the prbmise implied in the construction contract that the house would be built in a
workmanlike manner. Dunham, supra, at 111. The implied warranty of workmanlike quality
growing out of the construction contract, as distinguished from the contract of sale, has
always been recognized. Id. Modern developments in the field of real estate whereby houses
began to be mass produced, and the builder and seller became the same entity, cast the
purchaser back upon the no-liability rule of caveat emptor, since the contract was viewed as
one for sale of a completed house and land. Roberts, supra note 64, at 837.
0" See, e.g., Kordig v. Northern Constr. Co., 18 Ill. App. 2d 48, 53-55, 151 N.E.2d 470,
472-74 (App. Ct. 1958) (vendor not liable if defect patent); Tudor v. Heugel, 132 Ind. App.
579, 583-84, 178 N.E.2d 442, 444-45 (App. Ct. 1961) (vendor who made no false representations not liable to purchaser who inspected house prior to purchase); Crum v. McCoy, 41
Ohio Misc. 34, 38, 322 N.E.2d 161, 164 (Mun. Ct. Franklin County 1974) (caveat emptor
applies when conditions are open to observation and purchaser freely investigates); cf.
Hughes v. Stusser, 68 Wash. 2d 707, 711, 415 P.2d 89, 92 (1966) (caveat emptor will not
excuse "moral and legal obligation to disclose" defects not discoverable on reasonable
inspection).
e8 See 6A R. POWELL & P. ROH.AN, REAL PROPERTY 938.2[1], at 370.29 (1981). If the
purchaser exacted an express warranty from his vendor in oral form, the Statute of Frauds
and the parol evidence rule would operate to preclude enforcement of the warranty. D.
WHALEY, supra note 60, at 228. It has been argued that to demand that the home buyer
obtain an express warranty from the vendor assumes a greater level of sophistication on the
buyer's part than is ordinarily the case. See Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of
Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633, 642 (1965).
9 See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.20, at 53-56 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). Originally, nondisclosure was not deemed to be fraud because no duty to speak arose in the
vendor-purchaser relation. Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 678, 42 N.E.2d
808, 808 (1942). The genesis of the imposition upon the vendor of a duty to disclose nondiscoverable defects has been traced to 1945, Bearman, supra note 60, at 561, a period in which
the growth of home building and sales prompted recognition of the consumer's need for
protection. See note 64 and accompanying text supra. The vendor, as the party with superior knowledge, had a duty to disclose, and failure to do so was actionable fraud. Elder v.
Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 382, 384 P.2d 802, 804 (1963). Protection of the home buyer was
broadened even further by cases which allowed recovery when an innocent misrepresentaMINN.
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Inextricably intertwined with the doctrine of caveat emptor
was the merger doctrine. Arising from the peculiar two-step format
that characterizes a land transaction, whereby the parties first
enter into a contract of sale defining their rights and obligations,
and, at some later date, tender and accept the deed,7 0 the merger
doctrine served as a rationale for the application of caveat
emptor.7 1 Merger rested on the theory that since the home buyer
theoretically had an opportunity to inspect the premises between
contract and closing, any contract warranties of fitness and quality
not specifically recited in the deed would be extinguished. 2 The
law would imply no warranties from the deed, which was deemed
to represent completion of the contract and all of its terms."
Both caveat emptor and merger, functioning as general principles ordering land sale transactions, attracted criticism because of
the often harsh consequences of their application. 4 Courts seeking
to offer home buyers greater protection relied initially upon the
tion was made, Spargnapani v. Wright, 110 A.2d 82, 83 (D.C. 1954), and even when the true
facts of the matter being represented could easily have been ascertained by the vendee.
Suraci v. Ball, 160 Pa. Super. 349, 351-52, 51 A.2d 404, 405-06 (Super. Ct. 1947). But see
Sokolosky v. Tulsa Orthopaedic Assocs. Pension Trust, 566 P.2d 429, 431 (Okla. 1977).
70 See Roberts, supra note 64, at 857.
7' See Note, Commercial Law-Implied Warranties in Sales of Real Estate-The
Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor, 22 DE PAuL L. Rav. 510, 512 (1972).
72 6 A. CORBIN, CoNRACTS § 1319, at 310 (1962); 7 S. WILLISTON, TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 926, at 797-99 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1963); 2 RESTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 413,
at 778 (1932); 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 69, § 11.65, at 165-66. See generally Comment, Merger of Land Contract in Deed, 25 ALB. L. REv. 122, 122 (1961).
73 D. WHALEY, supra note 60, at 228-29. Merger of contract terms into the deed as a
matter of course ensured a predictable result in land sale transactions, and thus fulfilled the
ordering function of a comprehensive principle. The policy behind it was "to resolve all real
property problems by looking to only one recorded document and to make that document
carry all of the limitations of the transaction so that the whole world can know the complete
contours of the deal." Id. at 229; see Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689, 701 (S.D.
Fla. 1979); Knudson v. Weeks, 394 F. Supp. 963, 976 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Palos Verdes Corp.
v. Housing Auth., 202 Cal. App. 2d 827, 836, 21 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
Pybus v. Grasso, 317 Mass. 716, 718, 59 N.E.2d 289, 291 (1945); Dieckman v. Walser, 114
N.J. Eq. 382, 385, 168 A. 582, 583 (Eq. Ct. 1933); Cathedral Court Co. v. Sun Constr. Co., 72
Misc. 408, 410, 130 N.Y.S. 154, 155 (Sup. Ct. App. T., 1st Dep't 1911); Smith v. Vehrs, 194
Or. 492, 504, 242 P.2d 586, 591 (1952); Miles v. Mackle Bros., 73 Wis. 2d 84, 87-88, 242
N.W.2d 247, 249-50 (1976).
7' See Hamilton, supra note 63, at 1135. Caveat emptor has been characterized generally as "[t]he refusal of public authority, through legislature and judiciary, to accord effective protection to the purchaser .

.

.

."

Id. The soundness of the theoretical basis for the

merger doctrine has been attacked, and it has been labeled "merely a 'handy' phrase, of
convenient uncertainty and obscurity, that is used so as to avoid the necessity of clear
thinking and accurate analysis." 6 A. CoRBIN, supra note 72, § 1319, at 310.
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traditional exceptions to the doctrines. 75 Thus, cases of fraud or
mistake, 78 or purchases of property involving latent defects, 77 were
spared the harshness of its application. Another very useful
method of circumventing the "impediment of the deed" ' was the
collateral covenants exception, which invoked a distinction between those provisions of the contract which the parties intended
to merge into the deed,7 and those deemed independent, or collat15 But see Lutz v. Bayberry Huntington, Inc., 148 N.Y.S.2d 762,
767-68 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956). In Lutz, the court, rather than relying on exceptions to the doctrines of
merger and caveat emptor, fashioned an implied warranty of workmanlike quality out of two
other basic principles: (1) every contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the
parties, and (2) implied in every contract is a covenant that neither party will prevent the
other from receiving the fruits of the contract. Id.
The Uniform Land Transactions Act (the ULTA), a model for state legislation which
has not yet been adopted by any state, would eliminate the merger doctrine entirely. UNIF.
LAND TRANSACTIONS AcT § 1-309, commisioner's comment (1975), reprinted in 13 U.L.A.
539, 572 (1980). Section 1-309 of the ULTA provides:
Acceptance by a buyer or a secured party of a deed or other instrument of conveyance is not of itself a waiver or renunciation of any of his rights under the contract
under which the deed or other instrument of conveyance is given and does not of
itself relieve any party of the duty to perform all his obligations under the
contract.
Id. The section abolishes the doctrine of merger but permits terms of the deed, if agreed to
by the purchaser, to operate as modifications of the contract. Id. § 1-309, commissioner's
comment. The parties may also agree that acceptance of the deed waives the purchaser's
rights to claim damages for breach. Id. Such a limitation of remedy would be subject to
section 2-517 of the ULTA. Id. This section is patterned after section 2-719 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which provides for acceptable and unconscionable contractual modification or limitation of remedies. Id.; see U.C.C. § 2-719.
71 See, e.g., Richard v. A. Waldman & Sons, Inc., 155 Conn. 343, 346,
232 A.2d 307, 30910 (1967) (misrepresentation as to compliance with zoning ordinance); Pryor v. Aviola, 301
A.2d 306, 308-09 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (representation, with intent to deceive, that trees
could be cut down); Zander v. Blumenthal, 1 Ohio App. 2d 244, 245-47, 198 N.E.2d 93, 95-96
(Ct. App. 1964) (false representation that two-family house was three-family house); Jensen
v. Miller, 280 Or. 225, 230-32, 570 P.2d 375, 377-79 (1977) (conveyance based on mistaken
survey).
" As with caveat emptor, see notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra, the nature and
extent of the vendee's inspection is relevant in determining whether contract provisions
have merged into the deed. Where defects are known or should have been discovered, acceptance of the deed without complaint within a reasonable period extinguishes the right to
damages. Barrie v. Abate, 209 Md. 578, 583, 121 A.2d 862, 864 (1956). No merger and waiver
of remedy is implied when the vendee has no means of knowing of the defect. Galvin v.
Keen, 100 Ohio App. 100, 104-05, 135 N.E.2d 769, 772-73 (Ct. App. 1954).
" Snyder v. Roberts, 45 Wash. 2d 865, 872, 278 P.2d 348, 353 (1955) (quoting Howes v.
Barker, 3 Johns. Cas. 506, 509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808)).
" Knudson v. Weeks, 394 F. Supp. 963, 976 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (merger determined by
intention of parties, based on instruments and circumstances). See also Disbrow v. Harris,
122 N.Y. 362, 365, 25 N.E. 356, 357 (1890). In Disbrow, the court specifically rejected the
existence of a presumption of surrender of stipulations in an executory contract by acceptance of the deed. Id. A party's intent not to give up contractual provisions is established
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eral, which survived merger.8 0 This exception has been used, perhaps most effectively, to distinguish as collateral the contractual
agreement to construct the dwelling house from the agreement to
convey the land. 1 Having preserved this agreement, an implied
warranty of workmanlike construction could then be imposed,
82
based upon accepted construction-contract precedent.
From Implied Warranty to Strict Liability
The modern implied warranty of fitness had its origins in the
when conveyance of the deed is deemed to constitute only part performance of the contract.
Provisions of the unperformed portion of the contract then survive merger. Cox v. Bowman,
213 Or. 154, 161, 323 P.2d 60, 63 (1958). For example, when a contract provides for transfer
of title, among other provisions, transfer of title alone cannot be construed as full performance of all the contractual obligations, nor as substituted performance for them. Rapp v.
Murray, 112 Ohio App. 344, 348, 171 N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ct. App. 1960). Similarly, when a
deed was tendered to a vendee in possession under an installment contract so that she could
obtain a tax exemption, the deed, which conveyed less land than described in the contract,
did not trigger application of merger. The deed "was neither offered. . . nor accepted...
as a performance of the contract, but for a purpose entirely foreign thereto." Thompson v.
Reising, 114 Ind. App. 456, 464, 51 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Ct. App. 1943) (en banc).
'* Collateral covenants were defined in an early case as those unrelated to "title, possession, quantity or emblements of the land." Bull v. Willard, 9 Barb. 641, 645 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1850). The concept has been interpreted to embrace a wide variety of contractual provisions. See, e.g., Stevens v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 66, 57 A.2d 292, 294 (1948)
(agreement to furnish insulation and windows); Lipson v. Southgate Park Corp., 345 Mass.
621, 625, 189 N.E.2d 191, 194 (1963) (covenant to build house according to specifications);
Witbeck v. Waine, 16 N.Y. 532, 541-42 (1858) (provision to adjust balance of purchase price
after survey made); Liang v. Malawista, 70 App. Div. 2d 415, 419, 421 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596-97
(2d Dep't 1979) (per curiam) (agreement to remodel existing house).
81 Weinberg v. Wilensky, 26 N.J. Super. 301, 304-05, 97 A.2d 707, 709-10 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1953). In Weinberg, acceptance of the deed was held to perform the agreement to
convey; the agreement to build, however, was deemed "so far collateral to the conveyance as
not to be merged in the deed." Id. at 305, 97 A.2d at 710 (citing Brownback v. Spangler, 101
N.J. Eq. 388, 139 A. 524 (Ch. 1927)); accord, Kuniansky v. D.H. Overmeyer Warehouse Co.,
406 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1968); Holihan v. Rabenius Builders, Inc., 355 Mass. 639, 642-43,
246 N.E.2d 638, 640 (1969); cf. Cullens v. Woodruff, 137 Ga. App. 262, 263-64, 223 S.E.2d
293, 294-95 (Ct. App. 1976) (construction work to be performed after closing not affected by
doctrine of caveat emptor). This characterization of the transaction of sale, which was resorted to in the interest of expanding the home buyer's protection, appears to be a relic of
the peculiar format of the 19th-century real estate transaction, whereby separate contracts
were executed with a seller for the sale of the land and with a builder for the construction of
the house. See note 66 supra. It is suggested that such a characterization is inapposite to
contemporary real estate transactions, where the vendor of land and the builder of the
dwelling is oftentimes the same person.
82 Builders traditionally have been held to warrant that their buildings will be erected
in a workmanlike manner. E.g., Jose-Balz Co. v. De Witt, 93 Ind. App. 672, 675, 176 N.E.
864, 865 (Ct. App. 1931) (en banc); Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Coop. Elevator Co., 274 Minn. 17, 21, 143 N.W.2d 622, 625-26 (1966); Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va. 887, 901,
59 S.E.2d 78, 84-85 (1950).
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construction-contract warranty, which was extended by courts
seeking to afford the home buyer relief in situations in which the
house was unfinished when purchased.83 The implied warranty
that the house, when finished, would be fit for habitation thus
rested on the contract to build, not the contract to sell, and consequently was premised on the defendant's status as a builder rather
than a vendor.
Once the unfinished home exception was isolated, it was
adopted and functioned as a legitimate sub-doctrine within the array of rules ordering land sale transactions.8 The next step for
consumer-oriented courts was the abolition of the distinction
between finished and unfinished houses, and the invocation of an
implied warranty of fitness arising from the contract of sale for a
completed house.8 5 This step was prompted by the unavoidable
Two English decisions of the 1930's first recognized an implied warranty running to
the purchaser of an unfinished home. Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113,
120-21 (dictum); Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., [1937] 4 All E.R. 390, 392-93 (C.A.). The rationale given for distinguishing an unfinished house encompassed both construction contract
law and the buyer's inability to inspect, a concept crucial to the invocation of caveat emptor
In the first place, the maxim caveat emptor cannot apply, and the buyer, insofar
as the house is not yet completed, cannot inspect it, either by himself or by his
surveyor, and, in the second place, from the point of view of the vendor, the contract is not merely a contract to sell, but also a contract to do building work, and,
insofar as it is a contract to do building work, it is only natural and proper that
there should be an implied undertaking that the building work should be done
properly.
Id. at 395-96 (MacKinnon, L.J., concurring).
The American cases upholding an implied warranty in the sale of an unfinished
house begin with Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 342, 140 N.E.2d 819, 821 (CL
App. 1957), in which the court relied on the English precedent, see note 83 supra, to grant
relief to a purchaser whose basement was flooded due to defective sewer construction. Id. at
341-42, 140 N.E.2d at 820. The following year, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
a contract to construct a new dwelling was not merely a contract of sale, but one for work,
labor, and materials, in which there vested an implied warranty that the finished house
would be fit for human habitation. Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 832-33,
329 P.2d 474, 476 (1958). In another seminal case, Weck v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 IlL
App. 2d 383, 390-96, 184 N.E.2d 728, 731-34 (App. Ct. 1962), the court relied both on Miller
v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113, and on the traditional collateral covenants
exception to defeat the operation of the merger doctrine and afford the plaintiff the benefit
of an implied warranty.
The early cases formed a nucleus of precedent and, as the number of jurisdictions recognizing an implied warranty of fitness in sales of unfinished housing grew, so did the string
of citations legitimizing the new doctrine. See, e.g., Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158, 159-60
(Okla. 1963); Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 279, 387 P.2d 260, 263 (1963).
" See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83-84, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964). In Carpenter, the implied warranty was extended to cover the sale of a newly constructed home that
was complete at the time of contract. Id.
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recognition that the exception for unfinished houses so carefully
carved out by the English courts"8 was "a distinction without a reasonable basis. ' 87 Courts were willing to label houses lacking only
minor items of decoration "unfinished" in order to invoke the warranty.88 This led to the patently "incongruous" 89 result whereby a
purchaser signing a contract of sale one day before completion of
the house could successfully raise the warranty, while one who
signed the following day received no protection." In addition, the
underlying rationale that the purchaser of a completed house was
protected by his ability to inspect was criticized as "blithely oblivious to the realities of the situation," given the home buyer's probable lack of sophistication with respect to housing construction, and
the cost of hiring a professional."
Thus, a certain momentum was building in the early cases toward an overt judicial recognition of an implied warranty of fitness
accompanying the sale of a house, whether completed or under
construction. Accordingly, in 1968, a court was able to point to the
"rapid sickening" of caveat emptor in sales of realty.9 2 A second
line of cases which served to hasten the doctrine's demise premised
the liability of the builder-vendor upon his failure to disclose defects in the premises.
Initially, the English cases and the early American decisions
refused to find a vendor of real estate liable to his purchaser for
dangerous conditions which existed at the time the vendee took
possession.9 3 One rationale for this rule was that unlike the land-

80 See

note 83 supra.

87 Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964); see Bearman, supra

note 60, at 546.
88 See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964); Bearman,
supra note 60, at 546 n.16.
"1

154 Colo. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.

90 Bearman, supra note 60, at 546.
9' Id. at 545 & n.15.
92 Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tex. 1968). As documentation for the de-

cline of caveat emptor in sales of realty, the court was able to refer to the "Miller-PerryHowe-Weck-Jones-Glisan-Carpenter syndrome," id. at 558 & n.5, before going on to reject
unequivocally the notion that the caveat emptor rule had any contemporary relevance with
respect to the sale of a new house by a builder-vendor, id. at 561.
93 See Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 359-60, 270 S.W. 66, 69-70 (1925); Bottomley v.
Bannister, [1932] 1 K.B. 458, 468 (C.A.). In Bottomley, the court dismissed a wrongful death
claim for the death of the purchaser of a new home and his wife, caused by the builder's

failure to hook up a flue to the gas boiler. 1 K.B. at 468. The Tennessee court, in Tucker,
denied recovery to a vendee whose infant son was killed by a defective mantelpiece, noting
that upon delivering the deed the vendor relinquished control over the property and hence
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lord-tenant relationship, which continues after the signing of the
lease, the vendor-vendee relationship terminates upon delivery of
the deed.94 Thus, absent control or supervision over the property,
the vendor should not be deemed liable.95
An early exception to the rule held that the vendor's immunity did not extend to situations where he knew of a defect or
where he actively concealed a defect with the knowledge that the
purchaser was unlikely to discover it."5 An injured plaintiff, however, was still confronted with the heavy burden of demonstrating
the vendor's knowledge of the defect. Motivated by a desire to relieve plaintiffs of this burden, an increasing number of courts were
was insolated from liability for defects which subsequently caused injury. 151 Tenn. at 35960, 270 S.W. at 69-70.
151 Tenn. at 362, 270 S.W. at 70.
95 Id. The Tucker court distinguished the "quasi confidential relation of landlord and
tenant," which would raise a duty to warn. Id. at 373, 270 S.W. at 73. But see Belote v.
Memphis Dev. Co., 208 Tenn. 434, 440-41, 346 S.W.2d 441, 443-44 (1961), aff'd, 51 Tenn.
App. 423, 369 S.W.2d 97 (1962). In Belote, the court, holding for the injured daughter of the
purchaser, explicitly rejected the notion that protection should be based on the status or
relationship of the parties, invoking instead a generalized duty of care. 208 Tenn. at 440-41,
346 S.W.2d at 443-44.
See Belote v. Memphis Dev. Co., 208 Tenn. at 438, 346 S.W.2d at 442-43. The Belote
court based the liability of a builder-vendor, who covered up an opening left in the attic
floor, on "something like fraud." The scope of and limitations upon the exception for concealment or failure to disclose were set out by the American Law Institute in section 353 of
the Restatement of Torts, which provides:
A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition
whether natural or artificial involving unreasonable risk to persons upon the land,
is subject to liability for bodily harm caused thereby to the vendee and others
upon the land with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee, after the vendee
has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know of the condition or the risk involved therein, and
(b) the vendor knows of the condition and the risk involved therein and has reason to believe that the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 353 (1934).
The Restatement, Second, of Torts is essentially the same, with the substitution of the
phrase "physical harm" for "bodily harm" in the first clause. A second section is added,
however, which provides:
(2) If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in subsection
(1) continues until the vendee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to take
effective precautions against it. Otherwise the liability continues only until the
vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and to take such
precautions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353(2) (1965). The comment to subsection 2 emphasizes
that "[t]he liability of the vendor . . . does not continue for an indefinite period throughout
the subsequent history of the land sold. Where there is no active concealment. . . it continues only until the vendee, or his successors have had adequate time. . . to discover the. ..
condition." Id. § 353(2) comment g.
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willing to imply a constructive knowledge of the defect 9 7 on the
part of a builder-vendor, 98 predicated at least in part upon his status as a builder. 99
Despite the growing number of exceptions to the caveat
emptor rule, the privity doctrine continued to function in many
cases as a shield which barred an injured plaintiff's cause of action
against his builder-vendor.1 0 0 More progressive courts, finding no
rational distinction between a defective house and a defective
product, invoked the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.10 1 in
cases where privity was lacking to grant foreseeable plaintiffs recovery against builder-vendors. 10 2 Having overcome the privity
problem, 0 3 courts began to speak in terms of interest balancing, °
a development earlier identified in the analogous context of defective products.1 0 5
97

See, e.g., Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14, 19 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'd on other

grounds, 240 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (builder who defectively constructs house charged
with knowledge of his own negligence); Lowe v. Francis Constr. Co., 373 P.2d 51, 54-55
(Okla. 1962) (knowledge of builder's agent imputed to builder); Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C.
128, 134, 161 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1968) (builders have duty to disclose dangerous conditions
about which they know or should have known).
" See Roberts, supra note 64, at 844-45.
99 See notes 82 & 83 and accompanying text supra.
100 See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 104, at 680. With respect to the rule of privity in
the law of real property, it has been noted that "the ghost of Winterbottom v. Wright died
very hard." Id.
101 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); see text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
102 In Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958) (en banc), the court
relied on a close analogy between builders of houses and manufacturers of defective products, expressly acknowledging the application of MacPherson, to hold a general contractor
liable for negligent installation of a defective gas heater by his subcontractor. Id. at 725-27,
321 P.2d at 739-40. The New York Court of Appeals approved the extension of the MacPherson rule to structures erected on real property in Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3
N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957), noting "no logical basis for ...
a
distinction" between such structures and chattels. Id. at 144, 143 N.E.2d at 899, 164
N.Y.S.2d at 703-04; accord, Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 P.2d 849, 851-52 (Okla. 1961).
103 See Steinberg v. Coda Robertson Constr. Co., 79 N.M. 123, 124, 440 P.2d 798, 799
(1968). The Steinberg court dismissed privity as no longer a factor in determining negligence liability. Id.
104 See Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 863, 362 P.2d 345, 348, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 524
(1961) (en banc). In Stewart, the court clarified the question to be asked in determining
liability for negligence in a particular case as not one of privity, but of policy,
involv[ing] the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to
him, the degree of certainty that he suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, and the policy of
preventing future harm.
Id.
105 See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
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With the end of World War II, a new era of mass-produced
and frequently poorly built housing had dawned in response to the
surge in demand of a greatly expanded class of home-seeking consumers. 106 The same concern for safety which had been an impetus
in the law of defective products 0 7 impelled the judiciary to acknowledge the unique problems posed by mass-produced housing' 0 and, ultimately, to fashion consumer-oriented relief.
While the laudability of the goal of increased consumer protection was undeniable, an undercurrent of uneasiness was nonetheless perceptible in the face of growing numbers of policygrounded decisions, rendered on a sui generis basis.109 Since the
100

See 7 S.

WILLISTON,

supra note 72, § 926A, at 818. The implied warranty of habita-

bility was cited with approval, in light of conditions existing in the housing industry, in the
hope that it would "discourage much of the sloppy work and jerry-building that has become
perceptible over the years." Id.
107

See note 64 supra.

108 See Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'd on other

grounds, 240 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In Caporaletti, the court noted the inherent flexibility of the common law, which enables it to respond to changes in social and economic
conditions. The court expressly recognized the changes that had occurred in the housing
industry:
Homes are being constructed on a large scale by persons engaged in the building
business for the purpose of selling them to individual owners. The ordinary purchaser is not in a position to discover a latent defect by inspection, no matter how
thorough his scrutiny may be, because usually he lacks sufficient familiarity with
the complexities of building construction and the intricacies of applicable regulations. He should be able to rely on the skill of the builder who sells the house to
him. Otherwise he would be at the vendor's mercy. The realities of modern life
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the builder should be liable for injuries
caused by his negligence under such circumstances, either to the purchaser or to
an invitee.
Id.
109 See Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 725, 321 P.2d 736, 739 (1958) (en banc).
In Dow, the California Supreme Court surveyed the present state of the law with respect to
home buyers' remedies and found it unclear, observing that the many judicially created
exceptions to caveat emptor "afford[ed] an opportunity to hold the defendant liable without
stating any general rule." Id. Similarly, the court's approval, in Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91
Idaho 55, 67-68, 415 P.2d 698, 710-11 (1966), of the remedy of implied warranty in home
sales has been characterized as "manifest[ing] a compulsion to reach a socially desirable
result with little attention being devoted to the means used to reach the desired end."
Young & Harper, Quaere: Caveat Emptor or Caveat Venditor?, 24 ARK. L. REv. 245, 256
(1970); see Roberts, supra note 64, at 862. Roberts, who was not adverse to applying the
remedy of implied warranty to housing sales, nonetheless was moved to note that "[t]he
results under the doctrine of caveat emptor, though outrageous, were at least predictable."
Id. Such comments are symptomatic of a form of intellectual backlash in legal thought.
While courts have been criticized for a too rigid adherence to doctrine at the expense of
policy considerations, see notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra, a school of thought
which places the recognition and redress of social conditions in a position superior to order
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old rules of caveat emptor and merger had no place in the modern
housing market,110 the task confronting the courts was to identify
the new rules that would govern in their stead. Having conceptually linked the builder of a house with the manufacturer of a
product,"' and having applied MacPherson to soften the privity
bar, 11 2 the logical progression was to extend some type of liability
without fault to the builder-vendor of a defective house, analogous
to that imposed upon a manufacturer in the area of defective
products.
HOMEOWNERS' REMEDIES FOR DEFECTIVE HOUSING: TORT OR

CONTRACT?
The movement away from caveat emptor and toward expanded relief in the area of defective realty had as its impetus the
policy of protecting the consumer from personal injury-the same
policy that launched products liability as a separate branch of tort
law.113 As was true in the early products liability cases, the social
policy of compensating the injured consumer has been advanced,
in the housing context, at a rate which has outstripped the formulation of a supporting theoretical base.11 For example, the leading
case in the field of home buyer remedies, Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, Inc.,11 5 articulated in broad language a remedy for an occupant of a home who suffered personal injury from a dangerous
water heating system, but rested its holding on an all but indistinguishable mixture of tort and contract theory.
and predictability in the law has, in turn, been criticized as precluding any type of meaningful precedent or "intellectual system-building." G.E. WHrrE,supra note 1, at 73, 118. In the
area of defective realty, the impulse toward rational systematization has received its most
recent expression in the tendency to analogize the essentially ad hoc home sales remedies to
more established systems of relief. The implied warranty of habitability in new home sales
is analogized to the UCC warranty of merchantability, see note 154 and accompanying text
infra, and strict liability for defective housing is likened to strict products liability. See note
133 and accompanying text infra.
110 See Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex. 1968). The Humber court characterized the rule of caveat emptor as "an anachronism patently out of harmony with modern
home buying practices," id. at 562, and compared the usefulness of the merger theory under
modern conditions to that of a " 'unicorn hunting bow,"' id. at 556.
"

See note 102 supra.

See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390-93, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053-54
(1916); text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
"'1 See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
114 See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
11

1I 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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The plaintiff in Schipper, who was not in privity with the
builder-vendor, sued to recover damages in counts of negligence
and breach of warranty." 6 In upholding a cause of action in negligence, the court was merely applying the MacPherson rule of liability absent privity with respect to a plaintiff who could
foreseeably be injured by a defendant's negligence. 117 It is the
court's repeated characterization of the plaintiff's second theory of
liability as "implied warranty or strict liability" 1 8 that creates confusion as to the nature and extent of the remedy being fashioned.
It is clear that the court wanted to reach the result of strict liability in order to grant relief to the seriously injured plaintiff. 9e To
reach this result, it relied on concepts borrowed from sales law,
such as the home buyer's reliance on the builder's skill, and the
inequality of his bargaining position, to support the "implied warranty" part of its formulation,' 20 while at the same time making
," Id. at 80, 88, 207 A.2d at 320, 324.
"7 Id. at 82, 207 A.2d at 321. The court viewed the "impelling policy considerations"
underlying the MacPherson decision as applying with equal strength in the area of defective
housing. Id.; see notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra. The defendant contended that
tap water which issued from the faucet at essentially the same high temperature as it was in
the water heater was not a latent defect. In support, the defendant cited Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 145, 143 N.E.2d 895, 899, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699, 704 (1957), in
which the New York Court of Appeals reversed a finding of a cause of action in negligence
against a builder because the defect, an unrailed porch, was neither latent nor concealed. 44
N.J. at 84, 207 A.2d at 322. In rejecting the argument that, with respect to children, tap
water was no more a latent danger than a stove or a second floor window, id. at 87, 207 A.2d
at 323, the Schipper court identified the latter type of potential dangers as "incident to
normal living," id., 207 A.2d at 324. While a builder has no obligation to produce a house
that presents no dangers, reasoned the court, liability would be imposed where, as here, the
nature of the danger was concealed, and extended far beyond what would normally be expected. Id. The argument that a danger likely to be underestimated is a latent danger was
secondary to the court's basic position that" 'the bottom does not logically drop out'" of a
negligence suit against a builder upon a showing that a purchaser was aware of the dangerous condition. Id. at 81, 207 A.2d at 320 (quoting F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 28.5, at
1543 (1956)). A jury may still find unreasonable risk and negligence. 44 N.J. at 87, 207 A.2d
at 323.
...44 N.J. at 82, 90, 91, 96, 207 A.2d at 321, 325, 326, 328.
"I See id. at 89-90, 207 A.2d at 324-25. The New Jersey court began by identifying its
decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), as a
leading illustration of "[I]aw as an instrument for justice," with an "infinite capacity for
growth to meet changing needs and mores." 44 N.J. at 89, 207 A.2d at 324. The extension of
strict liability into the housing area was then presented as accomplishing a goal similar to
that of Henningsen in "keeping. . .common law principles abreast of the times." Id. at 90,
207 A.2d at 325.
120 44 N.J. at 91-92, 207 A.2d at 325-26. The court's sales-based rationales, incident to a
contractual relationship, had no relevance to the plaintiff before the court, who was a lessee
of the original purchaser. Id. at 75, 207 A.2d at 317.
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reference to a traditional policy ground for "strict liability" in
tort-the builder-vendor's greater economic resources and hence
superior risk-bearing capacity.12 1
The general tenor of the opinion in Schipper is an attempt by
the court to subsume the law of defective housing under the current state of products liability law. 122 Indeed, the court cited, as
part of the line of cases into which Schipper was purportedly being
fit, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,123 a decision embodying
one of the furthest extensions of products liablity law. In Santor,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a remote purchaser could
recover in strict liability from a manufacturer for mere loss in
value of a defective product, absent injury to himself or other
property. 2 4
The lack of focus in the Schipper decision, and the lack of
guidance as to the manner in which the liability of home builders

was to be shaped and narrowed in the future,1 25 stems from this
121 Id. at 87, 91, 207 A.2d at 323, 326. The defendant in Schipper, a mass developer of
homes, id. at 74, 207 A.2d at 316, was unquestionably a superior risk-bearer. The court
considered the argument that continued builder liability, after sale of the house, might not
be equitable because the builder would ordinarily discontinue his insurance coverage at that
juncture. Id. at 86-87, 207 A.2d at 323 (citing Sarnicandro v. Lake Dev., Inc., 55 N.J. Super.
475, 484, 151 A.2d 48, 53 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959)). The court distinguished that circumstance, however, suggesting that while it might be a factor in ascertaining the liability of a
"solitary" vendor, it was not an appropriate consideration with respect to an entrepreneurial
mass builder-vendor, who presumably would have adequate insurance in existence. 44 N.J.
at 86-87, 207 A.2d at 323.
Subsequent decisions by the New Jersey courts have not afforded differential liability
treatment to large and small builder-vendors. See McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 29394, 398 A.2d 1283, 1292 (1979) (warranty principles of Schipper extended to any builder,
regardless of status as mass producer); Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 210, 245 A.2d 1, 5
(1968) (negligence principles articulated in Schipper held applicable to all builders and contractors); Pattitucci v. Drelich, 153 N.J. Super. 177, 179-80, 379 A.2d 297, 298 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1977) (strict liability applied to a small builder); cf. Hodgson v. Chin, 168 N.J.
Super. 549, 553-55, 403 A.2d 942, 944-45 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (intimations that
builder-vendor liability may extend to commercial premises).
122 44 N.J. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325. As a preface to its holding, the court traced the
genesis of strict liability in food and drug cases, see notes 32-34 and accompanying text
supra, and its extension, in Henningsen, to defective automobiles, with the accompanying
rationale that while defective food or drugs could harm the user, a defective car could injure
persons other than the user. Id. These principles were then expressly held to be applicable
to the area of realty, id., and the extension of strict liability into this area was deemed to be
in keeping with the court's "'step by step"' approach. Id.
123 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (cited in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70,
82, 88, 207 A.2d 314, 321, 324 (1965)).
:2 44 N.J. at 63, 207 A.2d at 310-11.
125 44 N.J. at 95, 207 A.2d at 328. Although it articulated a sweeping new theory of
recovery for home buyers, the Schipper court furnished little guidance for future decisions.
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attempt to fit defective housing cases within the established system of products liability law.126 Indeed, in addition to finding no
meaningful distinctions between mass-produced homes and massproduced goods,12 the court left questions such as notice1 28 and
Indeed, the court noted that "we need not at this stage concern ourselves with [notice, statute of limitations, measure of proof]," since the plaintiffs in the instant case had specifically
established these elements. Id.; see Note, Expansion of Consumer Protection in the
Purchase of New Homes, 3 W. ST. U.L. REv. 106, 112 (1975). One commentator characterized the Schipper rationale as unclear and "leading to confusion as to what theory of recovery the court was instituting." Id. at 111. Indeed, subsequent cases have cited Schipper as
support for both strict liability, Bearman v. Watergate W. Inc., 391 A.2d 1351, 1357 (D.C.
1978), and contract-based implied warranty, Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 65-66, 415
P.2d 698, 708-09 (1966).
1I Cf. G.E. WHiTE, supra note 1, at 168 (strict liability has been acknowledged as the
theoretical underpinning of liability for defective products). No longer a renegade, strict
liability has become respectable. One commentator, charting the change in judicial attitude
from 19th-century adherence to negligence to 20th-century acceptance of tort law as a system of compensation, observed:
When the idea gets around that industry not only has no further need of subsidization but also should be made to assume the burden of paying for all damage
ensuing from its normal operations, then the climate is right for judges to begin
making an honest woman of the theory of absolute liability without fault. They
can then safely acknowledge her when they see her coming and, indeed, even declare that they had always thought highly of her.
Gregory, supra note 1, at 382-83.
1' The validity of the Schipper court's finding that no meaningful difference exists
between a chattel and a house has been questioned, on the ground that there is a greater
complexity and number of component parts involved in a house, as opposed to even a complex chattel such as a car. See 6A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 68, 938.4, at 370.49.50; 28 OHo ST. L.J. 343, 349 (1967). Moreover, even if one accepts the validity of the analogy between a house and a chattel, the developer in Schipper argued that the imposition of
strict liability upon builders would throw the housing industry into the same "'uncertainty
and chaos'" that afflicts the products liability field. 44 N.J. at 92, 207 A.2d at 326. The
Schipper court not only declined to address this consideration, but flatly declared that no
such confusion existed in the products liability field. Id. at 92, 207 A.2d at 326. But see
Roberts, supra note 64, at 866. Roberts noted just 2 years after Schipper was decided that
"the housing scene seems ripe for almost any rational solution before it falls victim to the
same confusion now affecting products liability in general." Roberts, supra note 64, at 866.
' The requirement of notice has affected the outcome of subsequent cases. See Major
v. Rozell, 618 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Mo. App. 1981). The Major court held that a builder should
be given notice of a defect and an opportunity to remedy it. Id. Where a builder acts subsequent to notice but falls to correct the defect, his action should be taken into account in the
calculation of damages. Id. The Major court suggested that a theory of implied warranty
could be applied by analogy to U.C.C. § 2-607(3), which provides that "[w]here a tender has
been accepted (a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy .... " Id.
Two questions which immediately arise in the peculiar context of housing sales are: (1) the
extent to which a consumer-oriented court would, in analogizing to the commercially oriented UCC remedies and limitations, give effect to the annihilation of "any remedy" for
failure to give notice, and (2) the duration of the "reasonable time" in which defects should
be discovered. With respect to products cases specifically decided under the UCC, it has
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statute of limitations129 to be answered in conformity with "the developing case law" of products liability.8 0 Moreover, the Schipper
court's purported merger of housing and products law ignores the
fact that the same confusion over contract versus tort principles
continues to plague products liability theory, in such areas as notice, statute of limitations, and the ability to disclaim liability,18 1
been noted that "a reasonable time... has as many meanings as there are fact patterns in
the cases." J. WHITE & R. SuMMERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-9, at 343 (1972). It is suggested that similar diverse results would obtain in
the area of realty, with the complex nature of a house necessitating the adoption of extended periods of time in which defects will be deemed discoverable. See Pollard v. Saxe &
Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 380, 525 P.2d 88, 91-92, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 651-52 (1974). In
Pollard,vendees who waited nearly 4 years to give notice of breach of the implied warranty
of habitability were barred from recovery. Id. The court deemed it appropriate to apply
statutory standards to common-law warranties, invoking the notice requirement of the California Commercial Code to bar recovery. Id.; CAL. COM. CODE § 2607(3) (Deering 1970). In
applying this "sound commercial rule" to a consumer transaction, the court considered the
following: "allow[ing] the defendant opportunity for repairing the defective item, reducing
damages, avoiding defective products in the future, and negotiating settlements." 12 Cal. 3d
at 380, 525 P.2d at 91-92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52.
With respect to the policy reasons behind U.C.C. § 2-607(3), the reasoning of the Major
court was in accord with the rationale of that section's notice requirement as enabling the
seller to adjust, replace, or otherwise cure in order to mitigate the buyer's loss and limit his
own liability. See U.C.C. § 2-607(3) comment 4. Of course, the notice requirement of U.C.C.
§ 2-607(3) would not be at all applicable to cases decided under strict tort theory. J. WHIrrTE
& R. SUMMERS, supra, § 11-9, at 343.
29 Whether an action brought against a builder-vendor for defects in realty is characterized as a tort or contract claim has been crucial to subsequent determinations of the
applicable statute of limitations. In Richman v. Watel, 565 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978), breach of the implied warranty of fitness was deemed a tort concept, with the 4-year
statute of limitations commencing when the buyer discovers or should have discovered the
injury. Id. at 102. Dictum in Sims v. Lewis, 374 So. 2d 298 (Ala. 1979), indicated that in no
event would the statute of limitations for implied warranty actions exceed the 6-year period
allowed for suits on an express warranty. Id. at 305. A Colorado statute limiting actions
against architects, contractors, engineers and inspectors for injury to person or property to 2
years after the claim arises, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110 (1973), was held inapplicable in
Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 446, 578 P.2d 637, 640 (1978) (en
banc). The claim for structural deficiencies causing injury to the house itself was deemed a
contract action covered by the normal 6-year statute of limitations. Id. at 447, 578 P.2d at
641. The same result obtained under the Colorado statute in Tamblyn v. Mickey & Fox,
Inc., 195 Colo. 354, 357-58, 578 P.2d 641, 644 (1978) (en banc), notwithstanding the fact that
the claim sounded in negligence rather than breach of contract or warranty.
Statutes of repose, such as the Colorado 2-year statute, are a common legislative response to expanded builder liability. See note 142 infra. Several such statutes, however,
have not survived constitutional challenge. E.g., Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d
821, 831 (Wyo. 1980). In Phillips,a 10-year limitation on actions in tort or contract based
on improvements to real property was held to embody an unconstitutional grant of immunity from suit rather than a statute of limitations. Id.
130 44 N.J. at 95, 207 A.2d at 328.
131 The problem of defining the scope of a builder-vendor's ability to disclaim liability

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:670

while the underlying policies themselves, such as the "risk-spreadarises when the implied warranty of habitability is analogized to the UCC implied warranty
of merchantability. The question then becomes whether UCC provisions permitting disclaimer and exclusion of warranties will apply. See U.C.C. §§ 2-316(2), 2-713(3). A disclaimer clause inserted in the contract of sale would attempt to limit the factual contexts in
which the vendor would be deemed to be in breach. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note
128, § 12-11, at 383-84. The requirements of a valid disclaimer clause are set out in U.C.C. §
2-316(2): "T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it
the language must mention merchantability and in the case of a writing must be conspicuous." Id. Courts which have decided defective housing suits under contract doctrines have
had to deal with contract defenses. For example, courts have not construed express warranties as limiting implied warranties. E.g., Hoagland v. Celebrity Homes, Inc., 40 Colo. App.
215, 216, 572 P.2d 493, 494 (Ct. App. 1977) (letter of express warranty insufficient to indicate builder's intent to limit common law implied warranties); Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders
Corp., 92 Ill. App. 3d 310, 316, 415 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (App. Ct. 1980) (express warranty
does not preclude or limit implied warranty, which is separate covenant growing out of dependent vendor-vendee relationship). It has been held, however, that disclaimer of the implied warranty violates no public policy, Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Ill. App. 3d 17, 22, 364
N.E.2d 986, 990 (App. Ct. 1977), and is within the parties' contractual power to accomplish.
Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 202, 225 S.E.2d 557, 567 (1976). Courts
have required disclaimers to be in writing and conspicuous, see MacDonald v. Mobley, 555
S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), and have refused to give effect to clauses that did
not meet these requirements. In Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 Ill.
App. 3d 310, 415
N.E.2d 1224 (App. Ct. 1980), the purported disclaimer clause provided: "[n]o representations, warranties, undertakings or promises other than those expressed herein whether oral,
implied or otherwise shall be considered a part of this transaction." Id. at 312, 415 N.E.2d at
1225. In reversing summary judgment for the defendant builder, the court held that it could
not be stated as a matter of law that the clause, which appeared near the end of a standard
form contract in the same print size and typeface, was sufficient to disclaim the implied
warranty. Id. at 317, 415 N.E.2d at 1229. The clause did not specifically mention "habitability." Id.; cf. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (disclaimer must mention merchantability). In addition, the
clause failed in its purpose by not explaining the consequences of disclaimer. 92 Ill. App. 3d
at 317, 415 N.E.2d at 1229.
An exclusionary clause, as distinguished from a disclaimer clause, restricts the remedies
available to the parties after a breach has occurred. J. WalTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note
128, § 12-11, at 384. Under U.C.C. § 2-719(3), "[c]onsequential damages may be limited or
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable." Id. In Colsant v. Goldschmidt, 97 Ill. App. 3d 53, 421 N.E.2d 1073 (App. Ct. 1981), a defendant builder who had
expressly warranted his house against defects for 1 year claimed he had effected a limitation
of remedies under U.C.C. § 2-719(3) through the following clause: "[b]uilder does not assume responsibility for any secondary or consequential damages caused by any defects." 97
Ill. App. 3d at 54, 421 N.E.2d at 1075. The court held that the clause, which was buried
within a 14-page typed contract of 515 lines, and neither mentioned habitability nor delineated the consequences of disclaimer, was insufficient to function as a limitation of remedies.
Id. at 57, 421 N.E.2d at 1077. Although U.C.C. § 2-719(3) explicitly sanctions the contractual exclusion of consequential damages, Colsant suggests that in a consumer transaction
such as the sale of a house, a rigid application of the section will be foreclosed by a liberal
interpretation of "unconscionable."
The foregoing discussion focuses on suits for property damage, since the limitation of
consequential damages for personal injury is prima facie unconscionable with respect to consumer goods under U.C.C. § 2-719(3). Under a theory of strict tort liability, the UCC provi-
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ing" theory of strict liability, have been criticized. 132 Clearly, therefore, the importation of products liability law does not, of itself,
create a universal and generalized system of ordering the field of
defective housing.' 33
sions regarding disclaimer are inapplicable, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
comment m, at 356 (1965), and it has been held impermissible for a seller to disclaim strict
tort liability. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 128, § 12-1, at 351 & n.10 (citing Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (en banc)).
132 See 44 N.J. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325. The Schipper court articulated the theory of
enterprise liability as the basic policy reason underlying strict products liability. Id. This
theory, which was posited by Justice Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962) (en banc), places the onus of
liability upon the manufacturer who launches his product into the marketplace rather than
upon the consumer, who is deemed "powerless" to safeguard himself from defective products. Id.; see notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra. Other policy reasons that have been
advanced are the desire to provide incentives to manufacturers to make safe products, and

the attempt to spread the cost of compensating accident victims throughout society. Epstein, supra note 36, at 658-59.
All of the policy reasons for strict products liability have been challenged. Subsequent
interpretations of the Greenman rule have been criticized for failing to take into account
postsale product misuse against which the manufacturer is "powerless" to safeguard. Epstein, supra note 36, at 658. The incentive argument ignores the lack of control that a manufacturer has over the conduct of employees and others in the distributive chain, id. at 659,
and does not give sufficient weight to the desire of most manufacturers, independent of the
fear of liability, to avoid a reputation for unsafe products. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV.
938, 945 (1957). The validity of the risk-spreading argument also has come under heavy
criticism. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 36, at 659 (risk-spreading argument so powerful it
can explain away all of tort law); Lang, Compensationof Victims-A Pious and Misleading
Platitude, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1559, 1559 (1966) (criticizing perceived attitude that continual
shifting of losses will somehow cause losses to disappear); Plant, supra, at 945-48 (unsound
assumption that manufacturers in general are in a position to distribute risk through
pricing).
13 Some of the products liability rationales are weakened in light of peculiarities characteristic of the home sale transaction. Considerations such as the consumer's inability to
identify the manufacturer responsible for his injury, and his lack of awareness of the process
by which the product reached him, while crucial to a policy of enterprise liability, see G.E.
WHITE, supra note 1, at 171, 203-04, are less meaningful in the context of a home buyer's
relationship with his builder-vendor. See Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 486-87,

53 Cal. Rptr. 267, 271 (Ct. App. 1966). Similarly, the theory that the risk of injury from a
defective product should be borne by the manufacturer, who can pass on the increased costs
to his customers, functions well in an anticompetitive industry in which price can be dictated by a small number of members, and adjusted to absorb increased costs. See Plant,
supra note 132, at 946-47. For vulnerable industries in which price is determined by many
external factors, however, such a price adjustment may be foreclosed by the danger that a
seller will price himself out of the market. Id.; accord, W. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 172 (1979). The home building industry would fall within the latter
category, since it embraces a multiplicity of small builders who do not do the requisite volume of business to absorb successfully a large judgment. See 6A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN,
supra note 68, %938.4, at 370.52.
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In contradistinction to the expansive approach adopted by the
Schipper court is the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals in
Wright v. Creative Corp.13 4 In Wright, the infant child of a second
purchaser of a home was injured when he ran through a sliding
glass door. 13 5 Asserting failure to install safety glass, the child's
parents sued the builder under theories of negligence, breach of
implied warranty, and strict liability.1 36 The court's brief opinion
distinguished the three counts on both policy and theory grounds.
The negligence claim was held to state a cause of action under
MacPherson,because a builder's duty of care does not rest on any
contractual basis.1 1 7 No cause of action was deemed established
under breach of implied warranty of habitability, a contract-based
theory which requires privity.1"s Finally, the count in strict liability
was disallowed on the ground that the policy goal of placing the
costs of injuries upon manufacturers is less compelling in the context of defective housing, given the legitimate distinctions between
a defective house and a defective chattel.1 3 9
Schipper and Wright arguably may be explained as decisions
which turn upon their respective facts.14 0 On a more fundamental
level, however, these cases illustrate contrasting approaches to the
extension of liability into a heretofore unprotected area. Schipper,
in emphasizing the strong policy reasons for granting relief to a
home buyer whose safety is threatened by a defect, does little to
sort out the morass of legal theories upon which such relief is to be
30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (Ct. App. 1972).
,35 Id. at 576, 498 P.2d at 1180.
136 Id.
at 577, 581, 498 P.2d at 1180, 1182.
13, Id. at 579-81, 498 P.2d at 1181-82.
138 Id.
at 581, 498 P.2d at 1182. The court stated, without elaboration, that the implied
warranty of habitability applies only to the first purchaser of a home. Id. (citing H.B. Bolas
Enters., Inc. v. Zarlengo, 156 Colo. 530, 400 P.2d 447, 450 (1965) (en banc)).
139 30 Colo. App. at 582-83, 498 P.2d at 1182-83. The Wright court distinguished the
imposition of strict liability for defective products and for defective housing in practical
terms, noting that "[a] builder cannot easily limit his liability by express warranties and
disclaimers, and it is easier to trace a defect to a builder than to a manufacturer as there is
more opportunity to make a meaningful inspection of a structure on real property." Id. The
Wright court implicitly declined to follow Schipper. Id. at 581-82, 498 P.2d at 1182.
140 Schipper presented the situation of a horribly burned child, 44 N.J. at 76, 207 A.2d
at 317, and a developer with considerable financial resources, id. at 74, 207 A.2d at 316.
Wright involved a less seriously injured child, 30 Colo. App. at 576, 498 P.2d at 1180, and a
building corporation of unspecified but assumedly smaller size, id. at 582, 498 P.2d at 1182.
The facts of Schipper, particularly the developer's pecuniary reasons for not installing the
safety device, 44 N.J. at 78-79, 207 A.2d at 319, may have militated toward a more sweeping
articulation of builder-vendor liability, and, to a certain extent, excused what might be
deemed judicial excesses.
"34
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premised, and creates, through the broadness of its language, a climate in which builder-vendor liability may be extended beyond
the unquestionably justified limit of dangerous defects. The
Wright court, on the other hand, engaged in the type of balancing
of interests that is associated with a flexible system of jurisprudence, 141 while at the same time adhering to the traditional parameters of tort and contract doctrine in defining the reach of strict

liability and implied warranty. The court's refusal to extend strict
liability, premised upon its view that the relevant policy considera-

tions were not at issue, is palatable under the particular facts of
the case, since the out-of-privity plaintiff was deemed to have established a cause of action in negligence. 142 Under different facts,
141 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. The Wright court expressly noted that it
would be "remiss in its responsibilities" if it did not weigh the necessity and effect of imposing liability without fault on a mass producer. 30 Colo. App. at 582, 498 P.2d at 1182.
14' See Roberts, Implied Warranty Doctrine as Applied to the Sale of New Housing,
(19671 N.Y. LAw REV. COMM'N REP. 37, 68-72. Roberts posits that negligence may in fact be
an "overlooked remedy" in the area of defective housing. Id. at 68. Negligence theory is
normally considered a remedy for personal injury resulting from the vendor's failure to disclose a latent defect. Id. at 69. It should be noted, however, that while the Restatement
spoke in terms of "bodily harm," the Restatement, Second, uses the phrase "physical
harm," leaving open the possibility of recovery for property damage caused by structural
defects, under a negligence theory. See note 96 and accompanying text supra. Compare
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 353 (1934) with

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS

§ 353 (1965).

Negligence theory may in fact have "implications of a perpetual duty far more sweeping
than the warranty principle," Roberts, supra, at 69, since no statute of limitations would
begin to run in a negligence suit against a builder-vendor until the harm actually occurred,
id. at 71. Thus, although the fault requirement would serve to limit a builder-vendor's liability, the duration of his exposure to potential liability would be theoretically expanded far
beyond the limits of contract-based warranty theory. See id. In the early case of Fisher v.
Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961), the plaintiffs recovery in negligence extended to the cost of repair of a defective floor. Id. at 214, 112 N.W.2d at 709. Although the
court spoke in terms of property damage, id., the cost of repair was mere loss of bargain
damages. See note 144 infra. The court indicated that even absent privity, damage to the
product itself should be recoverable, whether or not there is accompanying physical injury
or property damage. 15 Wis. 2d at 216-18, 112 N.W.2d at 710-11. The creation of such openended liability in negligence may result, as it did in Wisconsin, in the enactment of a statute
protecting builders from liability for damages sustained more than 6 years after construction. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.89 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
The creative use of negligence theory to fashion consumer relief has been cited as highlighting an "intellectual dispute" between those who favor fault-based liability for buildervendors and those who would impose enterprise liability under warranty or strict tort principles. Roberts, supra, at 69. It might be argued that requiring fault would serve to protect
an overburdened and economically unstable housing industry, see note 162 infra, in the way
that 19th-century negligence theory "subsidized" newly created, precarious industries. See
note 16 supra. It is unlikely, as a practical matter, that courts having recognized strict liability as applicable to builder-vendors would revert to a system of fault, and the Fisher formulation can be read as merely a "mutation in the law, possibly the product of chance." Rob-
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however, the court's rigid adherence to doctrine-based theories of
action might serve to foreclose relief to a plaintiff who does not
satisfy all of the components of any one theory; the Wright approach might thus be at odds with the policy of protecting the
homeowner's safety. .
The present state of the law governing defective housing reflects the type of inconsistent results that are the legacy of the
Schipper and Wright approaches. The inadequacies of Schipper,
for example, in creating a clear theoretical basis for liability, were
not so glaring in the context of the case, since the equities so
clearly were on the side of the physically injured infant plaintiff.
As the cases involving defective realty have advanced beyond
claims for personal injury, the Schipper court's invocation of a
multiplicity of theories of recovery, the Wright court's stringent
delineation of the components of each theory, and the traditional
limitations on damages recoverable under each theory, have led to
inconsistent results.
The tension that exists in products liability law between the
theories of strict tort and warranty liability1 4 s arguably reaches its

most extreme state when a consumer seeks recovery because the
product is worth less due to a defect. The majority view bars a
remote purchaser from recovery for such "economic loss" in warranty because privity is lacking, and in strict tort because physical
injury is lacking.14 4 Even those desirous of maintaining the tradierts, supra, at 72. Just as the rapidly developing theory of strict products liability eclipsed
and rendered almost obsolete the sales law of warranties, see note 59 supra, the use of
negligence principles has been deemed to have "atrophied amidst the trend of decisions
toward implied warranty proper." Roberts, supra, at 72.
143 See Shanker, supra note 56, at 11 ("deplor[ing]" the evolution of twin theories of
product liability law).
'14 See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 14-19, 403 P.2d 145, 149-52, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 21-24 (1965) (en banc). In Seely, Justice Traynor explicitly declined to follow the
Santor approach. See id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. The out-of-privity
plaintiff in Seely had been awarded damages in the trial court against the manufacturer of
the defective truck, on the basis of an express warranty. Id. at 13-14, 403 P.2d at 147-49, 45
Cal. Rptr. at 22. Thus, Justice Traynor's formulation of the rule that a manufacturer who
does not expressly warrant his product is not strictly liable in tort for defects causing only
economic loss is mere dictum. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. The Seely
dictum, upholding application of warranty rules for loss of bargain damages arising out of

the sales transaction, has nonetheless become the majority view.

PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,

PRODUCT LIABILITY UPDATE 1981, at 158. The rationale for the majority view is that, absent
express representations, a manufacturer should only be answerable for the product's safety,
not for its economic performance. Id. at 158-59. Justice Traynor went further, in Seely, in
approving the application of strict liability not merely to recovery for personal injury, but
also to recovery for physical injury to property, on the theory that the two were "so akin
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tional bifurcation of tort and warranty theory in products liability
cases have been troubled by the necessity of drawing the line between tort and warranty principles, given the substantive results
that flow therefrom.14 Moreover, line-drawing and categorization
in the law continues to provoke the type of criticism that is reminiscent of the nineteenth century reaction to legal science. 4" Thus,
it appears that any theoretical construct which states that one of
two separate systems must provide the complete solution to a
given class of claims inevitably will be challenged as artificial.1 47 In
. . . that there is no reason for distinguishing them." 63 Cal. 2d at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45
Cal. Rptr. at 24. The difficulty that subsequent courts have had in distinguishing physical
damage to the defective chattel itself (recoverable under strict liability) from mere economic
loss (not recoverable) is exacerbated in the context of defective housing. See note 153 infra.
One commentator has summarized the general distinction as follows:
Property damage can be conceptualized as the physical injury sustained by an
object, including a defective product itself, as a result of an accident caused by the
product. Economic loss may be viewed as not merely the appendage of a risk or
occurrence of personal or property damage, but as loss in product value (direct
economic loss) and loss stemming indirectly from that loss of product value, such
as loss of goodwill or anticipated profits (consequential economic loss). Damage to
the defective chattel itself is often regarded as an exclusively economic loss, but
American courts have long been prepared to award out-of-privity property damages to a buyer whose chattel self-destructs in a suitably dramatic manner. An
automobile which catches fire because of an electrical fault has sustained 'physical' damage, while another which oxidizes at a more sedate pace by rusting causes
'mere' economic loss to its buyer.
Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American ProductsLiability, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 651-52 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
,41 See Roberts, supra note 64, at 854. The author noted that his defense of the segregation of tort and warranty, a defense "rooted in a willingness to let sales law govern the
market place and in an unwillingness to let the chance result of any particular bargaining
session affect liability for personal injury," was somewhat of an "oversimplification." Id.
,4 See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
"v See, e.g., Shanker, supra note 56, at 15. While it has been conceded that a certain
amount of "line-drawing" is inherent in any system of jurisprudence, the lines along which
the developing law of products liability was ordered have been surveyed with disapproval:
"[d]eveloping a new system of law which increases the amount of line-drawing and then
accentuates the substantive results that follow from the placement of the line is clearly a
negative factor which may need to be carefully weighed before the new system is finally
accepted." Id. One commentator, in the modern products liability context, has rephrased
the tension between comprehensive doctrines and policy-based decisions identified in the
late 19th-century, see note 7 supra, as the conflict between "principled" and "nonprincipled" development. Donnelly, After the Fall of the Citadel: Exploitation of the Victory or Considerationof All Interests?, 19 SYRAcusE L. REV. 1, 2 (1967). Principled development is identified with Prosser's insistence on complete separation of tort from warranty
law; the initial use of the warranty doctrine to extend strict liability to remote purchasers is
considered an instance of nonprincipled development. Id. at 2-3. Faced with the artificial
tort/warranty construct, and cognizant of the reasons for the demise of legal science as the
prevailing philosophy of jurisprudence, the author noted that "[o]nly a purist who has not
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this vein, several products liability commentators have suggested
that the "cross-fertilization" of tort and contractual warranty concepts has been a healthy process in the law and should be continued, moving toward integration rather than further stratification of
theories. "
The significance of characterizing an action as sounding in tort
or in contract is not lessened in cases involving defective housing.149 If a suit for breach of implied warranty is viewed as a conlearned the lessons taught by legal realism would insist upon a choice." Id. at 3; accord,
Shanker, supra note 56, at 35 (the "real lesson of history" is "the folly of assuming that
products liability cases must be placed in a particular jurisprudential pigeonhole and then
decided entirely within the framework of that theory of law").
148 See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 147, at 3; Rabin & Grossman, Defective Products or
Realty Causing Economic Loss: Toward a Unified Theory of Recovery, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 4,
9 (1981).
149 The rejection of caveat emptor in sales of real property has not, as a general rule,
paved the way for recovery by a second purchaser in either strict liability or implied warranty. See Note, Builders' Liability for Latent Defects in Used Homes, 32 STAN. L. REV.
607, 608 (1980). With respect to implied warranty, a court's adherence to the privity requirement tends to be a function of its interpretation of the implied warranty as a contract
or a tort concept. See id. at 614-15, 624. If recovery under implied warranty is analogized to
products liability principles, then a second purchaser would be permitted to recover under
breach of implied warranty, as under strict tort, absent privity. See Barnes v. Mac Brown &
Co., 264 Ind. 227, 229, 342 N.E.2d 619, 620 (1976). The dissenting justices in Barnes viewed
the implied warranty as a contract concept, id. at 231, 342 N.E.2d at 621 (De Bruler &
Prentice, JJ., dissenting), and strenuously opposed abolition of the privity requirement, id.
at 232, 342 N.E.2d at 622 (De Bruler & Prentice, JJ., dissenting). Recoverable damages are
in part a function of the expectations of the parties to a bargain, and these expectations are
reflected in the purchase price. Id. (De Bruler & Prentice, JJ., dissenting). The Barnes dissenters deemed it inequitable, in calculating liability to subsequent purchasers, to refer to a
purchase price which the builder-vendor had no hand in fixing. Id. (De Bruler & Prentice,
JJ., dissenting).
A variation on the argument that a builder-vendor has no input as to the sale price to a
second purchaser was advanced in Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974).
In denying recovery to a remote purchaser who sued in implied warranty, the court noted
that the original purchaser may have knowingly waived defects and accepted the property
as is. Id. at 468. Thus, the court concluded, it would be incongruous to allow a subsequent
purchaser to recover for the same defects. Id. One commentator has noted that courts which
view the theory of implied warranty as a contract doctrine may still grant recovery to a
remote purchaser by deeming him to be a third-party beneficiary of the implied warranty.
Note, supra, at 627. Such a strained construction is reminiscent of the awkward theories
under which strict liability was initially extended to food and drink. See note 35 supra.
Even courts which espoused a contract-based implied warranty in home sales did not apply
it absolutely. See, e.g., Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 478, 503 P.2d 365, 367 (Ct. App.
1972) (implied warranty extended to first purchaser-occupant, even if realty company was
first purchaser); accord, Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wash. App. 595, 598, 494 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Ct.
App. 1972).
Remote purchasers have fared somewhat better under strict liability principles, but this
theory is sometimes limited to the context of mass producers of homes. See Kriegler v.
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tract action, a second purchaser would be barred from recovering
damages for economic loss because of his lack of privity. In a jurisdiction which follows the majority view of prohibiting recovery for
economic loss in strict tort, this remote plaintiff would seek to
characterize his injury as physical property damage, which is recoverable in strict tort, and would likely prevail in a court oriented
toward consumer relief. 1 0 Under a different scenario, a remote
purchaser might bring suit in a jurisdiction which permits actions
in breach of implied warranty absent privity. Such a plaintiff
might argue that the notion of a manufacturer/builder impliedly
warranting the merchantability/habitability of his product/house
by putting it on the market151 should be extended, in this context,
to include an implied warranty of the resale value of152the house on
which the loss of bargain action may be predicated.
Compounding the inequities potentially inherent in a forced
choice of one "artificial" theory of recovery over another are the
peculiar characteristics of the housing industry. One particularly
troublesome peculiarity, for example, attends the attempt to distinguish actual physical property damage to the house, which in a
majority of courts would be recoverable under a theory of strict
liability, from a condition which merely lowers the value of the
house, and, as a commercial loss, would only be recoverable in an
action in breach of warranty, by a party in privity with the
builder-vendor.1 53 A house with a cracking foundation, for examEichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (Ct. App. 1969); Avner
v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 610, 614-15, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633, 636, 639 (Ct. App.
1969); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965). But see
Patitucci v. Drelich, 153 N.J. Super. 177, 179-80, 379 A.2d 297, 298 (Super. Ct. Law Div.

1977). Recovery for purely economic loss has also been precluded under strict tort liability.
See Note, supra, at 613; note 144 supra.

180 See Rabin & Grossman, supra note 148, at 21-22.
'

See Donnelly, supra note 147, at 16-17.

152

See Rabin & Grossman, supra note 148, at 44-45.

See, e.g., Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(Ct. App. 1969); Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Ct.
App. 1969). In Kriegler, the second purchaser of a house sued the builder for failure of a
'5

defectively built heating system. Although the court labeled the action as one for "physical
damage," 269 Cal. App. 2d at 225, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 751, it awarded the plaintiffs damages for
"diminution in value" of their home, id. at 226, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 751. The court's reliance on
Schipper, a personal injury case, created even further confusion. Id. at 227-28, 74 Cal. Rptr.
at 752-53. In Avner, the plaintiffs recovered from the defendant developer, who "manufac-

tured" their lot, for damage to their house caused by improper land fill. Id. at 615, 77 Cal.
Rptr. at 639. Damage caused by subsidence of the soil was treated as property damage, even
absent impact or accident, and recovery was granted in strict tort. Id.
When a court following Seely declines to award damages for economic loss under the
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ple, has not been the target of violent physical impact, yet the
damage to the property will undoubtedly impair its value. 1 " The
blurred line between the two types of damage, and the strictures
imposed by doctrines defining when they are recoverable, has understandably led the out-of-privity plaintiff who suffers loss of
value damages to try to characterize his loss as physical property
damage in order to recover in strict tort, absent privity. 55 In products liability cases, the ramifications of this type of theory-selection have been criticized as an untenable circumvention of the warranty principles embodied in the U.C.C. through appeal to the
policy-based principles of strict tort.158 Proposed remedies have included the elimination of privity as a component of an action in
breach of implied warranty157 or, under the minority view, recovery
strict liability doctrine, it may, nevertheless, grant recovery under the theory of implied
warranty, despite the absence of privity. See Nobility Homes v. Shrivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79,
81 (Tex. 1977). The court in Nobility Homes noted that the UCC, as enacted in Texas, is
neutral with respect to privity, thereby leaving the issue to be decided by the courts. Id. at
81 (citing TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (Vernon 1968)). Relying on Morrow v. New
Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976), wherein a remote purchaser of a mobile
home sued for economic loss, the Nobility Homes court agreed that it would be unfair to
deny a consumer recovery for economic loss under an implied warranty theory when he
could recover, absent privity, for the "slightest physical injury" caused by a defective product. 557 S.W.2d at 81. The court also discussed negligence as a workable theory for recovery
of economic loss absent privity. Id. at 83; see note 142 supra.
" See Rabin & Grossman, supra note 148, at 23-24. A violent impact or accident
serves, in some jurisdictions, to clarify that the damage to the product itself is physical
property damage. Id.
'5
See note 153 supra.
'6
See Rabin & Grossman, supra note 148, at 7-8. The authors criticized the "wilderness of theories" characterizing suits for defective products, listing six potential avenues of
recovery: negligence, strict liability, misrepresentation, express warranty, implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose, and implied warranty of merchantability. Id. One of their
major criticisms is that it is possible for the selection of a particular theory of liability to
affect the outcome of a case. Id. at 8. Strict tort liability thus employed becomes "a device
to nullify defenses specifically allowed by statute." Id. at 17. To avoid this result, the authors contend that strict tort liability should be limited to personal injury only, in order to
preclude plaintiffs from evading warranty rules by the fiat of styling their actions in tort. Id.
at 8. In a similar vein, they would preclude actions in negligence absent personal injury,
again in order to foreclose any sidestepping of applicable warranty rules. Id. at 9-10.
'57 Id. Under the Rabin-Grossman proposed comprehensive system of relief in products
liability cases, the requirement of privity would be eliminated in actions for economic loss
brought under a theory of implied warranty. Id. at 9. Moreover, such theory would be the
exclusive remedy for both physical property damage and economic loss. Id. at 10. The argument generally advanced for the abolition of privity in implied warranty actions is that
under modern marketing conditions, the mere placing of an article in the "channels of
trade" raises an implied warranty from the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer of the
product's fitness. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 59, 207 A.2d 305, 309
(1965).
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for economic loss in strict tort. 158
Conceivably, resolution of the damages issue in the housing
context could be undertaken by continued analogy to products liability law. Unfortunately, however, a court pursuing such a path
must determine whether the proper analogy would be to a contract-based implied warranty of merchantability, or to a policybased system of liability such as that embodied in section 402A of
the Restatement. An additional impediment to such an approach is
that, just as the analogy between a defective product and a defective house may not be altogether apt, neither is the exclusive
choice of one set of ordered doctrines capable of furnishing comprehensive rules to govern all factual situations. 159
Consequently, it is suggested that the nature of a house, 160 the
position of a second purchaser,6 1 and the condition of the housing
industry 6 2 all militate toward an idiosyncratic theory of home
218

See text accompanying note 124 supra.

159 Cf. Shanker, supra note 56, at 36 (the rules governing strict products liability have

become as confining as those which previously had governed breach of warranty). Examining the tension between tort and contract theory in products liability law, the author questioned the legitimacy of the search for exclusive principles as follows:
Why must the legal mind look so desperately for an exclusive pigeonhole? Has not
the time come to recognize that the business of law is to determine liability between people and not to place their claims in pigeonholes? In determining liability, is it too much to ask of the courts that they consider all relevant legal theories
rather than playing a game of logic with only one?
Id.
IGOSee note 127 supra.
See note 149 supra.

161

102 See Lindsey, Housing Slump, The Impact Spreads, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1981, § 4,
at 1. The health of the home building industry is intimately tied to the state of the nation's
economy as a whole, with the economic recovery of the housing industry traditionally signaling the nation's emergence from a recession. Id. Thus, the current slump in the housing
industry, the longest since World War II, has been characterized by housing specialists as
"cutting deeply across a broad spectrum of the nation's economy." Id. As the potential for
large judgments in strict tort is introduced into the housing industry, the question of insurance coverage inevitably must arise. Since the 1930's, when the "massive infiltration" of
liability insurance militated toward the view that tort law is primarily compensatory, tort
law and insurance have been considered to be linked. G.E. WHITE, supra note 1, at 147-48.
This relationship has been analyzed in both critical and laudatory terms. See, e.g., G. SULLIVAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY.: WHO NEEDS IT? 125 (1979) (products liability theory has become
linked with erroneous presumption of seller's "infinite ability" to procure insurance); Friedman, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 HARv. L. REV. 241, 263-65
(1949) (tort law has moved toward a social insurance principle but justification exists for
continued separation); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 569-70 (1948) (liability insurance has made possible a system of
social insurance in the face of inadequate "horse and buggy rules" of tort law); James &
Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 431,
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buyer relief,'6 3 employing what is valuable and applicable from the
law of defective products. In fashioning such relief, what may serve
to create proper perspective, if not absolute order, is a recognition
that the reaction against caveat emptor that led to the emergence
440-42 (1950) (insurance has impacted beneficially on risk distribution and on prevention of
torts). The growth of products liability litigation is responsible for comprehensive levels of
insurance becoming the norm in most spheres of manufacturing. See generally W. KIMBLE &
R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 391-396, at 416-27 (Supp. 1981); G. SULLIVAN, supra, at
17-19; Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed Operations- What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 415-46 (1971), reprintedin
PRODUCT LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE, SCIENCE

705-36 (2d ed. P. Rheingold & S. Birnbaum

1975); Wallace, ProductsLiability Insurance: Scope of the Protection and Coverage Issues,
reprinted in PRODUCT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE 423-59
(1980).
The nature and extent of builders' insurance presently falls short of the level available
to many defendant companies in products liability suits. The initial response of the housing
industry to its growing scope of liability was the creation, in 1973, of a Home Owner's Warranty (HOW) program, a 10-year combined warranty and insurance plan applicable to new
single-family homes and condominiums. Note, The Home Owners Warranty Program: An
Initial Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 357, 357-58 (1976). Builder membership in the plan is
voluntary, so its effectiveness as a consumer protection device remains uncertain. See id. at
370-71, 374. As of 1979, the program was in operation in 46 states and approximately 14,000
builders were registered. Wolff, Herbert & Riechers, 'HOW' Settles Consumer Disputes, 17
URB. L. ANN. 333, 334 (1979). During the first year of the plan, the builder warrants against
defects in materials and workmanship as measured against HOW-approved standards, and
in the second year the warranty continues to cover "major" structural defects and malfunctions. During these 2 years, the HOW insurance carrier will pay any claims that the builder
is unable to meet. After the third year, the insurance carrier directly insures the home
against major structural defects. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 68, % 938.7[5], at
370.76-.76(6)(a); Wolff, Herbert & Riechers, supra, at 334-35; Note, supra, at 362-63. For a
discussion of an alternative to industry self-regulation, see Note, supra, at 370-80.
'"" Courts faced with the particular problems of creating a system of relief for injured
home buyers often have called for legislative enactments to resolve the confusion. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Cryer, 251 Md. 725, 727, 248 A.2d 795, 796 (1969); Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe,
219 V. 287, 293, 247 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1978). Several states have adopted statutory schemes
of home buyer remedies. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-116 to 120 (1981); MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-201 to 205 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 327A.01-.08 (West 1981);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:3B-1 to 12 (West Supp. 1981-1982). The ultimate efficacy of legislative solutions to problems in real property sales is questionable. On a basic level, it can be
argued that caveat emptor, as a doctrine built up and maintained for so many years by the
courts, should be dismantled, and a new system created, by the courts. See 28 OHIO ST. L.J.,
supra note 127, at 351. On a deeper level, however, it can be argued that the kinds of fine
distinctions and considerations of conflicting interests inherent in home buyer transactions
are not amenable to inflexible statutory articulation. Id.; cf. Traynor, The Ways and Means
of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1965) (no one definition of "defect" can resolve all cases). Judicial remedies have been upheld, in general, as
superior to legislative schemes on the grounds of both greater comprehensiveness and narrower focus. See D. HoRowITz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 12 (1977). Horowitz noted
that while legislative remedies might be "more systematic and inclusive," judge-made remedies have "a directness, a concreteness, and a lack of equivocation notably absent in
schemes that emerge from the political process." Id.
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of an implied warranty of habitability was premised upon a desire,
or policy, to compensate the home buyer for personal injury, 1 " not
to insure him against the economic risks that are inherent in any
commercial transaction. Thus, the proper scope of relief becomes
evident: any defect in a house which has the actual or potential
ability to endanger the safety of the occupants should be deemed a
compensable defect. 16 5 That such recoveries might comprehend socalled "cost of repair" damages, traditionally limited to a warranty
action, is certainly defensible under the strong policy of protecting
occupant safety. Indeed, it would be inconsistent with such a policy to deny a plaintiff damages to remedy a potentially dangerous
condition, while allowing recovery for personal injuries suffered as
a result of the unremedied condition. Of course, because such damages involve a personal as opposed to an economic interest, it is
clear that the proper theory of relief is strict tort, for it is this
vehicle by which personal losses typically have been redressed. 16e
Under the foregoing approach, those damages which related
only to diminution in resale value of a house, with no concomitant
hazard to its occupants, would not be recoverable in strict tort,
since the policy considerations which supported the extension of
strict tort liability to home builders are simply not applicable in
that circumstance. Moreover, a balancing of all competing interests
would appear to justify a continuation of an action in breach of
implied warranty, by a party in privity, as the sole means of recovery for purely economic loss. The basis of such a restriction is not,
however, the mere impulse to create and maintain ordered categories. Rather, the result rests upon explicit recognition that a policy
of consumer protection is valid in formulating a theory of relief for
See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
Whether physical damage to a house is recoverable in strict tort, or is deemed economic loss and not recoverable absent privity, might be made to turn on the same distinction employed by the Oregon Supreme Court in Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575
P.2d 1383 (1978) (discussed in Rabin & Grossman, supra note 148, at 25). The Russell court
held that where a product is "dangerously defective," id. at 594, 575 P.2d at 1386, or "manendangering," id. at 595, 575 P.2d at 1387, and the damage results as a consequence of the
defective condition, a cause of action in strict liability is established, id. Economic loss due
to malfunction or loss in resale value, even of a dangerously defective product, would not be
recoverable in strict tort. Id. Translated into the vocabulary of defective realty, this distinction would function to define the "habitability" of a house as its safety, not its potential
resale value, and strict liability recovery would attach only to those defects affecting occupant safety.
"' See Rabin & Grossman, supra note 148, at 18 (growth of products liability law
prompted by increased volume of personal injuries caused by defective products).
"'
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one class of plaintiffs, and that such policy considerations are not
relevant to another class of plaintiffs. The judicial process involved
in creating a system of relief for purchasers of defective housing is
thus a more sophisticated one, with a certain amount of order flowing organically, and not as an end unto itself.
CONCLUSION

The battle against caveat emptor having been largely won in
real estate sales, the task facing the courts has become the fashioning of theories of relief for injured home buyers. The recurrent tension in judicial thought between remedies which comprehend policy considerations and dissatisfaction with the essentially ad hoc
nature of such remedies was apparent in the development of products liability law. As that body of law was applied by analogy to
cases involving defective realty, a similar strain has developed,
most particularly identifiable in the conflicting bases for recovery
of loss of bargain damages, or economic loss. Inconsistency among
cases decided under warranty and strict tort principles highlights
the need for a purely idiosyncratic system of home buyer relief, in
which the interests of both the consumer and the home building
industry are balanced. Such balancing, it is suggested, justifies recovery, under strict tort principles, for any defect in a house which
poses potential danger to the safety of its occupants, regardless of
whether such recovery includes the cost of repairing an as yet latent condition. Mere loss of bargain, which leaves the homeowner
holding a less valuable piece of property, does not raise the policy
considerations that prompted creation of strict liability theory, and
thus should not be recoverable under that theory. Defects which
threaten neither health nor safety are risks of the commercial sales
transaction, and as such should be recoverable only by a party to
that transaction-through an action in breach of implied warranty.
The formulation of an interstitial theory, situate within but
not restricted by the characteristics of products liability law, will
perhaps bring to the area of defective realty the kind of order that
is not an end in itself, but rather the natural result of a policyoriented analysis cognizant of all competing interests.
Margaret A. Morgan

